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INTRODUCTION
Two starkly opposing approaches to the tort of
intentional interference with contract are currently being
entertained by courts. One approach starts from the
premise that a contract breacher is a wrongdoer and that
anyone who intentionally causes such wrongdoing is herself
a wrongdoer. The other approach builds from the notion
that the contracting party who chooses to breach a contract
has very likely made a socially desirable choice and that
anyone who intentionally causes such behavior should be
applauded. In each case, the blame- or praiseworthiness of
the breacher's actions is extended to the alleged tortfeasor
who has intentionally induced the breacher to breach.
The view of breacher as wrongdoer is quite inconsistent
with modern contract law. When the tort of interference
with contract is founded on this view it leads to the
spectacle of tort law seeking to deter the very same
behavior that contract law encourages. But the alternate
view, as the courts seem to understand it, calls for the
overturning of compelling interference precedents. This
Article proposes a third approach to the tort of intentional
interference with contract, one that recognizes that a con-
tract breacher sometimes is, and sometimes is not, a
wrongdoer. This approach is consistent with modern con-
tract law and shows why some of the interference
precedents present compelling cases for liability and should
not be overruled. No hint of this approach is to be found in
judicial opinions; yet it does such a remarkable job of
explaining the outcomes of cases that one can only suspect
that it comes closer to describing the intuitions of judges
than the judges' own explanations of what they are doing.'
1. One might ask why we should worry about interference doctrine if the
outcomes of the cases are in line with my proposed third approach. The problem
is that there are beneficial transactions that do not occur because they are
deterred by an overbroadly stated rule. The approach that is followed by many
courts is enough to scuttle any transaction that would fall within the
overbroadly articulated rule. This would be less of a problem if it were possible
for a prospective breacher and interferer to contract with respect to the risk of
tort liability, for example, by having the breacher agree to indemnify the
interferer for any tort damages owed to the aggrieved party. But such
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Under long established principles of interference law, a
person may commit a tort by persuading someone to breach
a contract even though, under contract law, that person has
every right to breach the contract. During the last twenty
years, the tort has come under heavy fire. Professor Russell
Weintraub's critical assessment is typical: "If you shopped
for law in Bedlam, you would expect to find a 'tort' of
interference with contract that could be committed by
making a better offer."2 He calls it a "counterintuitive and
inefficient monstrosity."3 It is counterintuitive because it
makes tortious the persuading or inducing of another to do
something that she is free to do on her own initiative, that
is, to breach a contract and pay damages. And it is
inefficient because it interferes with the mechanism by
which contract law encourages efficient breaches in a sig-
nificant class of cases.
Recent criticism of the tort springs from the modern
economic conception of contract law. The law has come to
regard the obligation to perform a contract as being gen-
erally equivalent to an option to perform or pay damages.
Holmes saw the matter this way more than one hundred
years ago.' More recently, the law and economics movement
has succeeded in bringing into the mainstream the aware-
ness that contract law operates in the way this remedies
model would predict,5 though there is disagreement about
whether that is a good thing.6 Contract remedies provide
incentives to breach when the breaching party will be made
so much better off by the breach that she will be able to pay
damages to the aggrieved party and still come out ahead.
The doctrine of efficient breach regards this as a positive
agreements are probably unenforceable. See infra notes 118-19 and
accompanying text. Ask any experienced transactional lawyer and you will hear
stories about deals that were put on hold upon discovery of the risk of
interference liability and terminated upon knowledge of the unenforceability of
risk-shifting agreements.
2. Russell J. Weintraub, The Ten Billion Dollar Jury's Standards for
Determining Intention to Contract: Pennzoil v. Texaco, 9 REV. LITIG. 371, 373
n.6 (1990) (citing David A. Anderson, An Errant Tort, 9 REv. LITIG. 409 (1990)).
3. Id.
4. "The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you
must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and nothing else." Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.8 (5th ed. 1998);
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 12.3 (2d ed. 1990).
6. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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outcome. If someone is made better off by the breach and no
one is made worse off, then the breach is efficient and
should be encouraged
The economic understanding of contract stands in sharp
conflict with the view of contract around which the tort of
intentional interference with contractual relations has been
constructed. Tort law has regarded the breacher of a con-
tract as a wrongdoer.' From that premise it follows easily
that intentionally causing someone to breach a contract is
itself a wrong-or, to put it in the current language of
interference law, it follows that "mere interference" with a
contract is improper in the sense that it permits the
imposition of tort liability.9
For some twenty years now, however, the economic
view of contract has been exerting pressure on the orthodox
approach to the tort. According to the economic view, part of
the mechanism for reaching desired outcomes in terms of
the performance or nonperformance of contracts is the
freedom of a contracting party to breach and pay damages.
But if a person is free to breach and pay damages, why
would we want to regard as tortious the persuading of that
same person to do what she is free to do?
The old, orthodox view that mere interference is
improper is under assault in many courts. The new,
insurgent view that liability for intentional interference
requires some independent wrong above and beyond merely
causing a breach has been adopted by some courts and is
being considered by others. There seems, however, to be a
7. Here and throughout this Article I use the word "efficient" to mean
"Pareto superior," unless something is said to the contrary. One state is Pareto
superior to a second state when at least one person is better off in the first state
relative to the second state, and no one is worse off. There are other criteria of
efficiency that are less palatable from the standpoint of private law. Under the
Kaldor-Hicks criterion, one state is superior to another if everyone is better off
in the aggregate in the first state relative to the second. If I value your watch
more than you do, then in a Kaldor-Hicks sense, focussing only on the
particular transaction, it is efficient if I steal it from you. The theft is not Pareto
efficient, however, because someone (the victim) is made worse off by it. If I
value your watch more than you do, in a Pareto world I should negotiate to buy
it from you. See Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); J.R. Hicks, The
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); JACK HIRSHLEIFER &
AMiaAI GLAZER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 445-46 (5th ed. 1992); POSNER,
supra note 5, § 1.2.
8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. v (1979).
9. See infra notes 10-23 and accompanying text.
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tendency in the courts to regard these two approaches as
exhausting the universe of choices: mere interference is
either improper or it is not, without regard to the nature of
the breach caused by the interference. Both the old and the
new approaches are problematic. The old view is incon-
sistent with the freedom of a contracting party to breach
and pay damages. The new view is consistent with the
freedom to breach, but it would require the overturning of
some interference precedents that present compelling cases
for liability. When these precedents are examined with the
focus on the actions of the tortfeasor, they appear to be
cases of mere interference. When the focus is shifted to the
breach that is caused by the interference, however, the case
for liability appears to be strong not because the tortfeasor
"merely interfered" with a contract, but because the
tortfeasor intentionally caused what I will call a wrongful
breach.
I argue that the courts should determine the
improperness of mere interference by looking to the nature
of the breach that is caused by the interference. It is the
rise of the economic view of contract that has created the
current crisis in interference law, and the economic view of
contract has something to tell us about the resolution of the
crisis. Some breaches are desirable under the economic
view. Mere interference that causes such a breach should
not be deemed improper, as the insurgent view of the tort
recognizes. But it would be a gross oversimplification of the
doctrine of efficient breach to say that every breach that
contract law currently encourages is a socially desirable
breach. That might be so if contract law were perfect, but it
is not. There are classes of breaches that the law of
contracts would like to discourage, even though the rules of
contract remedies actually encourage them.
Recognizing that there are cases of wrongful breach
that the remedies rules of contract do nothing to deter is
the key to the dilemma faced by the courts as they attempt
to define the new contours of the tort of intentional
interference in such a way that it does not work at cross
purposes with contract law. The courts should look at the
nature of the breach that is caused by the interference and
should hold that mere interference is not improper unless it
leads to a breach of contract that is wrongful.
Part I of this Article describes the tort with particular
attention to cases of mere interference in which the alleged
649
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tortfeasor does nothing worse than offer a contracting party
a better deal. These are the cases that occupy the
battleground between the two opposing approaches to the
tort. Offering a better deal was regarded as improper and
thus tortious unless privileged under the orthodox view
that reigned almost unchallenged until 1980; it continues to
be law in many if not most U.S. jurisdictions. Around 1980
the new view, which does not regard the offering of a better
deal as inherently improper, begins to appear in some
courts. The new view permits contract law's mechanism for
encouraging efficient breaches to operate, but as Parts II
and III will demonstrate, it cuts liability back too far.
Part II shifts the focus to contract law and develops the
notion of wrongful breach. Wrongful breaches are those that
contract law would prevent or deter if it were not for some
failure within contract law itself. An example of this is the
breach for which damages are not an adequate remedy and
for which specific performance is not available.
Part III brings the focus back to tort law and examines
the improperness of mere interference while keeping in
mind the distinction between breaches that are wrongful
and those that are not. The cases that the orthodox view
has regarded as mere interference cases are, for the most
part, cases of interference leading to a wrongful breach. The
rule that emerges-that mere interference should only be
regarded as improper when the breach caused by the
interference is wrongful-is one that appears to cut liability
back from the orthodox view. But it is in fact remarkably
consistent with the outcomes of cases.
I. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT AND
THE BETTER DEAL CASES
A. Intentional Interference with Contract
One who intentionally interferes with a contract be-
tween another and a third party is liable to the other in tort
for damage caused by the interference, provided that the
interference is improper." There are many variations on the
elements of the tort. In some jurisdictions the contract
interfered with must be enforceable or the plaintiff is
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
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relegated to the related tort of interference with prospective
contract, which affords the defendant a broader range of
privileges." In other jurisdictions liability for interference
with contract may be found even where the contract is not
enforceable by the aggrieved party because it is "at-will" or
because the contract is voidable by the third party." In
some jurisdictions there can be no tortious interference with
contract unless the contract has been breached;" in others
it is enough that the interference cause some diminution in
the value of the other's contract rights. 4 A party who
11. See, e.g., Macklin v. Robert Logan Assoc., 639 A.2d 112 (Md. 1994);
Idaho First Natl Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824 P.2d 841 (Idaho 1991);
Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians, P.C., 326 S.E.2d 460 (Ga. 1985); Guard-
Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 449-50 (N.Y.
1980). Running parallel to intentional interference with contract is a different
variety of the same tort, intentional interference with prospective contract. The
two are so related that a court's treatment of an interference-with-prospective-
contract case is often a source of important information about that court's
interference-with-contract jurisprudence. In the interference-with-prospective-
contract cases, the courts have generally settled on the position that there can
be no liability for offering someone a better deal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 768(1) (1979). It is surprising that there could ever have been any
doubt about this, given the sort of marketplace upon which our economy is
based. Allowing a plaintiff to collect damages in tort from a defendant who did
nothing more than offer to do business with a third party with whom the
plaintiff planned or hoped to do business (the plans or hopes not having risen to
the level of a contract) would go a long way toward outlawing the very core of
our competitive market system.
One way of characterizing the question asked by this Article is whether
offering a better deal should be similarly privileged in the interference with
contract cases. Much of what we know about the answer to that question comes
from dicta generated while courts struggle with the related question of whether
there is such a privilege in the law of interference with prospective contract.
12. See, e.g., Nordling v. Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 505
(Minn. 1991) ("[Alt-will employment subsists at the will of the employer and
employee, not at the will of a third party meddler."); Bochnowski v. Peoples Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282 (Ind. 1991); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587, 590-91 (Cal. 1990); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1041 (Ariz. 1985); see also RESTATEENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 766 cmt. f ("It is not, however, necessary that the contract be legally
enforceable against the third person."). But while these jurisdictions analyze at-
will contracts under the rubric of interference with contract, it is generally true
that they nevertheless afford the defendant the same broader range of
privileges that are available under the tort of interference with prospective
contract.
13. See, e.g., NBT Bancorp Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc., 664
N.E.2d 492, 496 (N.Y. 1996).
14. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec., 791 P.2d at 592; Lewis v. Oregon Beauty
Supply Co., 733 P.2d 430, 434 (Or. 1987) (holding that discharge not a
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breaches a contract may be found liable in tort to the
aggrieved party for conspiring with a third party in the
breach. 5 In other jurisdictions such a claim may be barred
as an attempt to parley a contract claim into a tort claim.'6
This section focuses upon a particular element of the
tort: the requirement that the interference be improper. 7
Sometimes the improper nature of an interferer's behavior
is relatively clear. In many cases the interferer's actions can
be recognized as independently tortious with respect to the
interference plaintiff, even though all of the technical
requirements of the independent tort cause of action may
not be satisfied. 8 In these cases the interference tort
provides an alternative cause of action to the plaintiff, but
one that may escape some of the technical requirements of
pleading or proof associated with particular torts. Improper
interference might also involve behavior that is inde-
pendently tortious not toward the interference plaintiff, but
toward a person with whom she has contracted. 9 In these
cases, the interference plaintiff would generally be regarded
as outside the sphere of liability of the independent tort.
The interference tort provides a means of extending liability
for the underlying tort beyond persons who would otherwise
be protected by tort law, but in a way that is limited by the
requirements of the interference tort itself.
20
Sometimes it is clear that interference is not improper.
necessary element; it was enough that third party's interference caused
aggrieved party to resign employment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766
(1979).
15. Winkler v. V.G. Reed & Sons, Inc., 638 N.E.2d 1228, 1234-36 (Ind. 1994).
16. Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454 (Cal.
1994).
17. The Restatement chose the word "improper" for its characterization of
the tort because it was a word that was not "traditionally identified with a
different tort so as to possess a special meaning that would affect its meaning in
connection with this tort" and because it did not suggest that issues connected
with it "must be a matter for the case of either the plaintiff or the defendant."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Ch. 37, 6 (1979).
18. See, e.g., Lewis, 733 P.2d at 434 (finding improper interference
consisting of physical and verbal intimidation, threats and defamation).
19. See, e.g., Swaney v. Crawley, 157 N.W. 910 (Minn. 1916) (finding
improper interference consisting of intentional misrepresentations addressed to
breaching party).
20. For a more detailed analysis of the interference tort as a means to
extend traditional tort liability in a carefully limited way, see Harvey S.
Perlman, Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash
of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U. CI. L. REV. 61, 69-78 (1982).
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It is probably not improper interference to give honest, good
faith advice to a friend or family member that causes the
advisee to breach a contract. 2' Nor is it improper for an
agent, acting within the scope of her agency, to cause her
principal to breach a contract.22 Without a version of this
privilege corporate officers and directors could be found
personally liable in tort for acting on behalf of their
principal, the corporation, in making and implementing
corporate decisions to breach contracts. In addition, it is not
improper for a person to interfere with the contract of
another in order to protect a vested economic interest."
Without this privilege plaintiffs could evade corporate veil
piercing rules, making corporations liable in tort for
causing their subsidiaries to breach contracts.
21. The Restatement describes a privilege that would cover the giving of
advice where one is "charged with responsibility for the welfare of' the advisee.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1979). It describes another privilege
that applies to the giving of "honest advice within the scope of a request for the
advice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 772. One can imagine many in-
stances of advice not falling within either of these specific sections: for example,
unsolicited advice to a sibling with whose responsibility one is not "charged." In
such a case, the Restatement would have us turn to its general balancing test
for determining improperness-a relatively indeterminate factors test.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767. Judges have shown common sense in
dealing with cases of advice. See, e.g., Click Model Management Inc. v.
Williams, 561 N.Y.S.2d 781 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding no intent to procure
breach where model was merely accommodating friend when she said friend
should come over to Ford Agency).
22. See, e.g., Jones v. Runft, Leroy, Coffin & Matthews, Chartered, 873 P.2d
861 (Idaho 1994) (holding that attorney who acted as representative of company
could not be liable for causing company to breach contract); Nordling v.
Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 507 (Minn. 1991) (concluding that
company employee who acts in good faith is privileged to cause company to
breach contract with other employee); Murtha v. Yonkers Child Care Ass'n, 383
N.E.2d 865, 866 (N.Y. 1978) ("[A] corporate officer who is charged with inducing
the breach of a contract between the corporation and a third party is immune
from liability if it appears that he is acting in good faith."). In the scheme of the
Restatement, these cases fall under the privilege for those "charged with the
responsibility for the welfare of a third person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 770 & cmt. b.
23. See, e.g., Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 156 (N.Y. 1996) (holding
75% shareholder of corporation privileged to interfere with contract of
corporation "unless there is a showing of malice or illegality"); Ran Corp. v.
Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646 (Alaska 1991) (holding that lessor was privileged to
withhold consent to assignment of lease of his property); Langeland v. Farmers
State Bank of Trimont, 319 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Minn. 1982) (finding that
defendant's "entirely legal" debt collection efforts were "in furtherance of a
superior legal right").
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Between cases of otherwise wrongful behavior and
cases of privileged interference is an important set of cases
in which the only arguable wrong is the interference itself.
This includes what I will call the "better deal cases," in
which a party interferes with another's contract by offering
to do business with the third party, knowing that the third
party's acceptance of the offer will involve the third party's
breach of the contract with the other. Whether the law
should regard this kind of interference as improper is a
fundamental question about the sort of economy we wish to
have. It is a question that currently has an uncertain
answer.
On one hand, we may wish to regard contract rights as
inviolable and protect them against trespass by persons not
party to the contract. A contract regime that punished
contract breachers, unlike ours which scrupulously denies
damages beyond compensation, would be consistent with
this view. So might a regime that regarded compensatory
damages as sufficient to do justice between the contracting
parties but which nevertheless sought to deter that subset
of breaches that involved interference by third parties. The
traditional, expansive view of interference liability springs
from some such premise. And there are scholars who defend
it, finding no conflict between tort and contract in the better
deal cases: tort and contract are said to be pursuing
different values.24 Such a view is puzzling, however, because
if we were really interested in deterring breaches of
contract we could do so by generally compelling per-
formance of contracts or by assessing penalties beyond
compensation for their breach. This view would lead to a
marketplace in which people would be wary of dealing with
those who had already contracted. Offering someone a deal
would be acceptable behavior, but offering someone a deal
in place of an existing one would be subject to reprobation.
On the other hand, we might regard contracts as
24. See Maura Lao, Tortious Interference and the Federal Antitrust Law of
Vertical Restraints, 83 IOWA L. REV. 35, 60 (1997) ("If tortious interference is
concerned with the preservation of community values that are not generally
recognized in contract analysis, then it can be seen as complementary with
contract law, not contradictory, despite its conflict with the efficient breach
theory." (footnotes omitted)); William J. Woodward, Jr., Contractarians,
Community, and the Tort of Interference with Contract, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1103,
1180-81 (1996) (discussing "different ways of thinking about and addressing the
complexities of human relations and human exchange").
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establishing rights and obligations solely between the
contracting parties. Each person would then be responsible
for her own contract obligations. This view would lead to a
marketplace in which people would be free to offer to do
business with others. If those others had prior commit-
ments, that would be their concern. Whether or not they
would be likely to live up to their commitments or breach
them would depend in part on the rules of contract re-
medies. The recent turn toward reevaluating expansive
interference liability is consistent with this approach.25
While the question of whether the law should regard
this kind of interference as improper currently has an
uncertain answer in the law of torts, it is one that has been
asked and answered in a closely related context. It is one of
the questions at center stage in the debates over the nature
of contract remedies." Many argue for the first regime, but
the law of contracts has chosen the second. Answering the
question one way in the law of contracts and another way in
the law of tortious interference is a strange sort of
compromise. Since we have chosen the second in the law of
contracts, why would we undercut it when it comes to
interference law? Mixing the two regimes makes as much
sense as a corporation deciding to construct a building, but,
as a concession to a losing faction of the board, deciding to
periodically demolish twenty percent of the building under
construction. Recognizing that both contract and tort law
are in the hands of the same court in each jurisdiction leads
to an even stranger variation of this simile: it is as if the
same construction crew worked four days a week
constructing a building and then one day a week did
excavation work on an adjacent lot, unwittingly
undermining the very same building it was constructing.
The next two sections explore the two competing views
on the improperness of mere interference-the two views
that the courts seem to regard as their only choices. The
first, that mere interference is improper, reigned almost
unchallenged from soon after the birth of the tort in 1853 to
about 1980. A number of articles were published around
1980 that seem to have set off a round of new scrutiny of
the tort in many state high courts. Several of the courts
have since said that mere interference would not be
25. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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regarded as improper in cases of interference with contract,
but these pronouncements may be somewhat unstable.
When these courts actually come face to face with a better
deal case that involves a wrongful breach there is some
danger that, consistent with their binary understanding of
the issue, they will fall back to their settled positions and
hold that interference is wrongful after all. This Article
argues that the courts should recognize what is already
implicit in their precedents: that there is an intermediate
position that looks to the character of the underlying
breach.
B. Mere Interference Prior to 1980
The orthodox view, that mere interference with contract
is improper in itself, took shape not long after the modern
tort was born in 1853. Prior to 1853 there was a common
law action for "retaining another person's servant during
the time he has agreed to serve his present master."
Blackstone tells us that "this, as it is an ungentlemanlike,
so it is also an illegal act."" It would be anachronistic to
regard this old action as a protection of a contract right. It
is true that the action protected the master's right to the
labor of his servant, but the master was entitled to this
protection because of his status as master in relation to his
servant. Husbands had a similar action for the abduction of
their wives, and parents for their children. That these
actions were a matter of relative status is supported by
Blackstone's observation that "in these relative injuries,
notice is only taken of the wrong done to the superior of the
parties related ...while the loss of the inferior by such
injuries is totally unregarded.""9 It is only with the
nineteenth century transformation of the action from one
that protected the master-servant relationship to one that
protected contract rights generally that it becomes
meaningful to ask about the improperness, as a legal
27. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 142
(1768). This action is itself a kind of generalization by the common law courts of
two more specific earlier actions, one statutory and one in trespass. These
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matter, of mere interference with a contract. 30
Lumley v. Gye,31 the first modem case of interference
with contract, was decided by the Court of Queen's Bench in
1853. Lumley, a concert promoter and lessee of the Queen's
Theatre, succeeded in an action for damages against Mr.
Gye, his counterpart at Covent Garden. Lumley had con-
tracted with the famous opera singer Johanna Wagner to
sing exclusively at the Queen's Theatre.3 Gye lured her
away with an offer of higher pay, and for this he was liable
to Lumley in tort. Justice Coleridge, the lone dissenter,
objected to the expansion of the old action beyond the ex-
ceptional relationship of master and servant. He observed:
in respect of breach of contract the general rule of our law is to
confine its remedies by action to the contracting parties, and to
damages directly and proximately consequential on the act of him
who is sued; that, as between master and servant, there is an
admitted exception; that this exception dates from the Statute of
Labourers, 23 Edw. 3, and both on principle and according to
authority is limited by it.
3
3
If this opinion had carried the day, Mr. Lumley would
have lost his case. Ms. Wagner was not a servant; she was
merely under contract. The three other judges apparently
saw no reason to limit the action in this way. Justice
Crompton wrote:
I think that we are justified in applying the principle of the action
30. The link between the modern tort that protects a contract right and the
older action that protected the master's property interest in his servant is
evident in Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601 (1871). Within eight days of the
certification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in
December of 1865, one Georgia plantation owner, Mr. Howard, had already
hired his former slaves to continue working for him as employee/servants. A
neighbor, Mr. Salter, enticed Howard's former slaves to come and work for him.
Howard succeeded in an action in damages against Salter "for enticing servants
out of his employ." Id. at 603.
31. 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 2 El. & Bi. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
32. For well-told versions of the story of the birth of the interference tort,
see Francis Bowes Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663,
663-75 (1923); G.A. Owen, Interference with Trade: The Illegitimate Offspring of
an Illegitimate Tort?, 3 MONASH U.L. REv., 41, 41-58 (1976); Note, Tortious
Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth Century: The
Transformation of Property, Contract, and Tort, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1510 passim
(1980) [hereinafter Tortious Interference].
33. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 760, 2 El. & Bl. at 246 (Coleridge, J.,
dissenting).
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for enticing away servants to a case where the defendant mali-
ciously procures a party, who is under a valid contract to give her
exclusive personal services to the plaintiff for a specified period, to
refuse to give such services during the period for which she had so
contracted, whereby the plaintiff was injured.
34
Thus was the tort of interference with contract born.
Expanding the coverage of the action to include contracts of
exclusive personal service as well as master-servant rela-
tionships may not seem to be much of a change. But the
shift that took place in Lumley, from viewing the rela-
tionship as one of master and servant to viewing it as a
contractual one, was significant. It paved the way for the
action to expand to include all contracts. The English Court
of Appeal held in 1893 that the action would not be
restricted to cases involving exclusive personal service."
The tort has followed a similar path in most jurisdictions in
the United States, where the tort is not restricted to any
particular type of contract.36
Another factor mentioned by Justice Crompton in his
characterization of Lumley-a factor that could have served
to limit the tort-was that the procurement was malicious.
In 1905, however, the House of Lords would say, in a case
in which the trial court had found that the defendants acted
"'without malice of any kind against the plaintiffs,' 07 that
"[i]t is settled now that malice in the sense of spite or ill will
is not the gist of such an action as that which the plaintiffs
have instituted."38 The requirement of malice suffered a
similar fate in the United States.39 While the courts con-
34. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 755, 2 El. & Bl. at 231 (Crompton, J.).
35. Temperton v. Russell, 1 Q.B. 715 (C.A. 1893).
36. See, e.g., Campbell v. Gates, 141 N.E. 914, 915 (N.Y. 1923);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 69 A. 405, 407-08 (Md. 1908);
Comment, Inducing Breach of Contract: Herein of Contracts Terminable at Will,
56 Nw. U. L. REV. 391, 394 n.17 (1961) [hereinafter Contracts Terminable at
Will]. That the tort was applicable to all employment contracts, "if not to
contracts of every description" was established as early as 1871 in Mass-
achusetts. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555, 567 (1871).
37. Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners' Fed'n, 2 K.B. 545, 556
(1903) (C.A.) (quoting trial judge), affd, [1905] A.C. 239 (H.L.).
38. South Wales Miners' Fed'n v. Glamorgan Coal Co., [1905] A.C. 239, 246
(H.L) (Lord Macnaghten).
39. See, e.g., Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 125 N.E. 817, 818 (N.Y. 1920)
(holding that malice "does not mean actual malice or ill will, but consists in the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification"); Cumberland
Glass Mfg. Co. v. De Witt, 87 A. 927, 931 (Md. 1913) ("Malice in this form of
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tinued for some time to speak of a requirement of malice,
Professor Sayre could say in 1923 "that such words are
becoming little more than empty phrases, with small prac-
tical influence in the reaching of actual decisions." °
When the malice requirement drops away, nothing
stands in the way of viewing interference with contract as
wrongful in itself. The connection is apparent in the
following language quoted by the Mississippi Supreme
Court in a recent case finding liability in a better deal case:
A contract confers certain rights on the person with whom it is
made, and not only binds the parties to it by the obligation entered
into, but also imposes on all the world the duty of respecting that
contractual obligation. . . . If one maliciously interferes in a
contract between two parties, and induces one of them to break
that contract to the injury of the other, the party injured can
maintain an action against the wrongdoer. . . . When one has
knowledge of the contract rights of another his wrongful
inducement of a breach thereof is a wilful destruction of the
property of another and cannot be justified on the theory that it
enhances and advances the business interests of the wrongdoer....
Maliciousness does not necessarily mean actual malice or ill will,
but the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social
action does not mean actual malice, or ill will, but consists in the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse."), affd, 237 U.S.
447 (1915).
40. Sayre, supra note 32, at 675.
Justice Crompton mentioned a third factor in Lumley, which for a time
would serve to limit the application of the tort. The contract, the breach of
which was procured, was a valid one. Lumley, 118 Eng. Rep. at 755, 2 El. & B1.
at 231. This apparently continues to be a restriction on the tort under English
law. See CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS 1185 (17th ed. 1995); Contracts
Terminable at Will, supra note 36, at 395-96. Already in 1915 the United States
Supreme Court would say, "[tihe fact that the employment is at the will of the
parties, respectively, does not make it one at the will of others." Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33, 38 (1915). Such a view was apparently in accord with a substantial
number of state decisions. See Contracts Terminable at Will, supra note 36, at
396-97 & n.32. But ef. Sayre, supra note 32, at 701 ("[E]xcept for a few scattered
dicta, the current of authority [in 1923] is wellnigh unanimous that no action
for enticement can be brought where the service was at will."). Today it is
widely accepted in the United States that there can be liability for interference
with contract even though the plaintiff would have no right to enforce the
contract that was the subject of the interference. See Bochnowski v. Peoples
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 571 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ind. 1991); Wagenseller v.
Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1041 (Ariz. 1985); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. g (1979). New York is the exception. See Guard-





Different jurisdictions progressed through the stages of
the tort at different tempos, but almost without exception
the story is the same in each. A point is reached where the
requirement of actual malice or unlawful means is dropped
and from that point on the tort is characterized in such a
way that liability for offering a better deal is at least
threatened if not expressly assured. In 1908, for example,
Maryland's high court declared: "Although many of the
cases speak of the act as being maliciously done, it would
seem to be clear that express malice is not necessary if the
act is wrongful and unjustifiable."
2
Kentucky was one of the last states to relax its wrong-
fulness requirement. Kentucky was long said to be a state
in which the tort was not recognized unless the act of
interference involved an independent wrong such as fraud
or the use of force.43 In 1958 the Kentucky Supreme Court
spoke of finding liability for interference with contract
where the interference was "malicious or without justifi-
cation."' More recently the court has stated that Sections
766B, 767 and 773 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
"fairly reflect the prevailing law of Kentucky."4' The
Kentucky court, having accepted the Restatement view on
interference with prospective contract (Section 766B), is
still free to shape its law of interference with contract as it
will, but its relaxation of what had been a strong
requirement of improperness for the interference torts
generally is a movement in the direction of the twentieth
century orthodoxy.
41. Ramondo v. Pure Oil Co., 48 A.2d 156, 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946)
(emphasis added) (quoting Klauder v. Cregar, 192 A. 667, 668 (Pa. 1937)),
quoted in Cranford v. Shelton, 378 So.2d 652, 655 (Miss. 1980). In Cranford a
lessee broke its lease in order to enter into a better deal with another lessor.
This appeared to violate a nineteenth century statute (which was a descendent
of the fourteenth century English statutes that spawned the interference torts).
The court, doubting that the statute applied, analyzed the case under common
law interference principles.
42. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 69 A. 405, 410 (Md. 1908).
43. See Contracts Terminable at Will, supra note 36, at 394 & n.18.
44. Derby Road Bldg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Ky. 1958)
(emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Foley Constr. Co. v. Ward, 375
S.W.2d 392 (Ky. 1964).
45. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855, 857
(1988).
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The commentators during this long period of expanding
liability do not appear to be focusing on the better deal
cases as one of the primary evils against which the tort is
directed. Nevertheless, to the extent that they mention the
matter they uniformly take positions that would lead to lia-
bility in the better deal cases."
Professor Sayre, for example, in a 1923 article wrestled
with the problem of open-ended liability that flowed from
the relaxation of the malice requirement:
[T]oday the law undertakes to forbid not only the wanton
destruction of property in the form of contract rights out of pure
malevolence, but also the stealing or misappropriation of such
property where the motive is to benefit, economically or otherwise,
the defendant. In other words mere trade competition, henceforth,
will no more constitute a justification for stealing another's
property in promised advantages, than it will for stealing his
COW.
Sayre was concerned that this broad tort would sweep
too many cases within its ambit. He worried, for example,
that a mother who caused a school to dismiss troublesome
classmates of her children might be liable in tort.48 Sayre
proposed a distinction between breaches that were directly
caused and those that came about "only as an incidental
and undesired.., by-product in the seeking of some quite
different object, unconnected with the object which led to
the making of the contract.' 9 An incidental breach would be
one where "the defendant was not seeking to appropriate
for himself the promised advantages of the plaintiff, but
was seeking an object quite foreign to that which the
plaintiff sought in the making of the contract."" Liability
would thus be "confined to cases of deliberately stealing or
misappropriating another's promised advantage where the
46. See Sayre, supra note 32, at 683-86; Charles E. Carpenter, Interference
with Contract Relations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728, 754-57 (1928); Fowler V. Harper,
Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 873, 881 (1953);
Charles Q. Kamps, Interference with Contractual Relations: A Survey of the
Wisconsin Law, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 231, 242 (1959).
47. Sayre, supra note 32, at 676.
48. Under the scheme of the second Restatement, the mother could invoke
the privilege of one "charged with responsibility for the welfare of' another.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 770 (1979). See supra note 21.
49. Sayre, supra note 32, at 678.
50. Id. at 683.
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defendant seeks the same object which the plaintiff sought
to secure by the making of the contract .... ))I
For example, a manufacturer, who for a number of
years has supplied a wholesaler but who is under no
contract to do so, finds himself a buyer who is willing to pay
more than the wholesaler. The manufacturer sells to the
higher-paying buyer even though he knows of specific
contracts that the wholesaler has with its customers that
the wholesaler will now have to breach. Sayre thought it
intuitively obvious that liability should not attach in this
case.52 Applying his test we see that the manufacturer
would be protected because it sought to enter into an
advantageous business relation with a new buyer and did
not seek to appropriate for itself the advantages promised
to the wholesaler under the wholesaler's contracts with its
buyers. If the manufacturer had induced a third party to
breach a contract to buy from the wholesaler and to buy
instead directly from the manufacturer, then presumably
under Sayre's view there would be liability: the
manufacturer would be seeking to secure the very object
that the wholesaler sought to secure by making the contract
with the third party. Sayre appeared to be interested
primarily in cutting liability back, but the class of cases he
left standing clearly included the better deal cases.
Competition would "ordinarily justify injury to another's
interest in trade expectancies but not ordinarily injury to
another's interest in promised advantages."53
It is a much discussed fact in the cases and articles of
this long period of expansion, that the tort presents a clash
of competing values-the sanctity of contract obligations on
one hand and the freedom to behave competitively on the
51. Id. at 685.
52. Id. at 678.
53. Id. at 700. Dean Charles Carpenter proposed a distinction for
determining whether a privilege of competition should be available for
interference with contract:
[W]e must differentiate the cases where the defendant acts for the
specific purpose or with the desire of invading, or knows that the end
he seeks to accomplish in itself constitutes an invasion of the plaintiffs
contract interests, from the cases where the act is done for a purpose
other than a desire to invade, although an invasion incidentally and
indirectly results from the acts done. Competition gives no privilege to
invade in the former while it does in the latter group of cases.
Carpenter, supra note 46, at 754. Carpenter appears to have regarded the
offering of a better deal as falling outside the privilege. See id. at 755-56.
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other-a conflict that must be reconciled one way or
another. What seems never to be noticed during this period
is that the resolution of the conflict in the direction of
treating contract rights as property, which supposedly
honors the value of contract enforcement, leads to a deep
inconsistency with one of contract's most fundamental
features: that contract damages are substitutional and
compensatory.
It is sometimes noticed, as it was by Justice Coleridge
in his Lumley dissent, that the tort at the moment of
expansion conflicts with then-existing doctrine. This does
nothing more than acknowledge that expansion involves
doctrinal change. What is missing is any sense of the
conflict of principles that stand behind tort and contract
doctrines. When Justice Coleridge remarked that "in
respect of breach of contract the general rule of our law is to
confine its remedies by action to the contracting parties,
and to damages directly and proximately consequential on
the act of him who is sued,""4 he stopped short of asking
why that should be so. The remedies rules of contract law
are structured to encourage certain breaches. If we wished
to change that, we could adopt a number of alternative
regimes. Until such a change occurs, however, the ex-
pansive tort of interference with contract presents a
conflict: it deters breaches that the law of contracts
encourages.
The twentieth century orthodoxy leaves us then with
the tort we would expect to find if we "shopp[ed] for law in
Bedlam."55 Liability can be imposed for "making a better
offer."56 It can be imposed in cases "in which honest repre-
sentations are made to competent adults and there is
neither threat, nor violence, nor abuse of confidence, nor
undue influence, nor misuse of economic power."57 Liability
can be imposed in this way because judges, when wearing
their tort hats as opposed to their contract hats, appear to
agree with the Restatement (Second) of Torts when it calls
both the interferer and the contract breacher, quite simply,
54. Lumley v. Gye, 119 Eng. Rep. 749, 760, 2 El. & B1. 216, 246 (Q.B. 1853)
(Coleridge, J., dissenting).
55. Weintraub, supra note 2, at 373 n.6.
56. Id.
57. Dan B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34




C. The 1980s: A New Note of Caution
In the last twenty years the interference torts have
come under a barrage of scholarly criticism, some of which
has found an audience in the courts. A number of state high
courts have either cut back tortious interference liability or
at least announced that arguments for the expansion of
interference liability would be subject to intense new
scrutiny. Just where the better deal cases stand after this
cutting back of the expansion of the tort will be taken up
below. First, however, let us take a brief look at the articles
that, at least in part, helped to bring about the new scru-
tiny of the tort in the courts.
Professor Dan Dobbs criticized the tort from a number
of perspectives.59 He argued that by allowing liability where
the only improper behavior is having an improper motive,
the defendant is punished for her state of mind." By
protecting the aggrieved contract party's right in the
performance of the breaching party as a property right that
is good against the world we treat the breaching party as
the property of another. By ignoring the fact that the
decision to breach or not lies in the hands of the breaching
party, we treat the breacher as a being without will.62 And
by attaching liability to the giving of advice or the
persuading of another to do what she is otherwise free to
do, the tort chills behavior that potential defendants should
be free to engage in, including speech.63 This is a tort, he
warned, that seemed to expand without reason: "It cannot
be a principle of law that expansion of liability is in itself
the goal, or a theorem of justice that liability is always
just."6
Dobbs argued against universal liability, but he con-
ceded that "a universal rule of non-liability" would also be
undesirable.65 He went on to "suggest some lines of thought
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. v (1979).
59. Dobbs, supra note 57.
60. See id. at 347-50.
61. See id. at 350-56.
62. See id. at 358-59.
63. See id. at 361-63.
64. Id. at 337.
65. See id. at 365.
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that might be capable of developing an analysis for less-
than-universal liability." 6 All but one of his categories
involved behavior on the part of the interferer that is
improper independent of the interference itself. The one
exception was his suggestion that liability might appro-
priately be found in cases of interference with "those
contracts that are specifically enforceable,"67 a notion that is
entirely consistent with my broader suggestion that liability
attach to interference that leads to a wrongful breach.
Professor Harvey Perlman argued forcefully from the
standpoint of economic efficiency that interference with
contract should not be found tortious unless it is somehow
independently improper.6 Professor Perlman would limit
the tort of interference with contract to "cases in which the
defendant's acts are independently unlawful"; or, somewhat
reluctantly, he might also include a quite limited set of
cases involving "improper motivation" where there were
"objective indicia of activity producing social loss."69 He
would apparently find no liability in many of the cases
involving what I will call below "wrongful breach," unless
the defendant committed some additional wrong such as
fraud. This position would require the overruling of quite a
bit of established interference law.
Neither Dobbs nor Perlman focuses on the wrongful-
ness of the underlying breach in the sense that I do. While I
do not think that my approach is contrary to the spirit of
their analyses, Dobbs' and Perlman's articles certainly seem
to envision a narrower tort than I do.
References to Perlman's or Dobb's article appear in
opinions of the high courts of twenty different states. Taken
together, those opinions (and the decisions that may have
been influenced by them) portray a new era of caution with
respect to the interference torts. The Louisiana court, for
example, cited both Dobbs and Perlman in 9 to 5 Fashions,
Inc. v. Spurney, ° a case that recognized the tort of inter-
ference with contract in Louisiana for the first time.
Louisiana was the last of the fifty states to recognize the
tort. At the same time that it did so the court said it was
66. Id.
67. Id. at 375. Professor Dobbs' analysis of this issue was admittedly
sketchy, and he invited further development of it. See id. at 376.
68. Perlman, supra note 20.
69. Id. at 97-98.




to adopt whole and undigested the fully expanded common law
doctrine of interference with contract .... Some aspects of this
tort have been subjected to serious criticisms, leaving open a good
many questions about the basis of liability and defense, the types
of contract or relationship to be 71protected, and the kinds of
interference that will be actionable.
The court left for the future the contours of the tort beyond
the case before it, which held only that a corporate officer's
privilege to interfere with the contracts of the corporation
was not absolute.
Another case citing Dobbs and Perlman is Wagenseller
v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital72 in which the Arizona
court discussed the breadth of "the 'privilege' of a
supervisor to interfere in an employment relationship."
73
The court rejected an approach that would place the burden
on the defendant of proving that its actions were justified,
in favor of a requirement that the plaintiff show that de-
fendant's actions were improper before liability can attach.74
It is difficult to see anything defensible, in a free society, in a rule
that would impose liability on one who honestly persuades another
to alter a contractual relationship. [Cites to Dobbs and Perlman.]
We find nothing inherently wrongful in "interference" itself. If the
interferer is to be held liable for committing a wrong, his liability
must be based on more than the act of interference alone. Thus,
there is ordinarily no liability absent a showing that defendant's
actions were improper as to motive 
or means.
A certain shifting of burdens is apparent here-from
requiring the defendant to show that its actions were
justified (the position of the first Restatement) to requiring
the plaintiff to show that the defendant's actions were
improper (a position that is consistent with the range of
possible readings of the black letter of the second
Restatement). This shift is certainly important for deter-
71. Id. at 234 (citations omitted).
72. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985).
73. Id. at 1042.
74. The position of the Restatement on this point was self-consciously
neutral on the issue of burdens. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 37, at
5 (1979); Perlman, supra note 20, at 67.
75. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1043.
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mining which tortious interference cases can be dismissed
on the pleadings or decided on summary judgment. But it
also tends to track the issue of liability in the better deal
cases.76 If interference is prima facie tortious, then to escape
liability the defendant must convince us with something
like the following: "My violation of an existing contract
right was justified because I sought to further my own
economic interest." Regimes that place the burden on the
defendant to justify any intentional interference do not
usually accept economic self-interest as a justification.
However, there is nothing about placing the burden on the
defendant that logically entails the rejection of self-interest
as a justification. Likewise, in a regime in which it is the
plaintiffs burden to show not only interference but im-
proper interference, it would seem that the defendant would
not be put to the task of justification in a better deal case
because interference itself would not be regarded as
improper. Again, however, there is no logically necessary
connection between these positions. One could well imagine
a regime that would require a showing of improper
interference, but that would also regard "deliberately steal-
ing or misappropriating another's promised advantage" as
improper.78
The Arizona court in Wagenseller quite strongly sug-
76. For an illustration of the interplay between burdens and liability, see
Insurance Assoc. Corp. v. Hansen, 782 P.2d 1230 (Idaho 1989), in which the
majority found that defendant had not intentionally interfered, that in fact the
defendant, acting on the advice of counsel, had tried hard not to interfere. On
the dissent's view, the majority is making the mistake of requiring the plaintiff
to show wrongfulness of interference, something that the plaintiff was unable to
do in light of the defendant's reliance on the advice of counsel. According to the
dissent, it is up to the defendant to show justification, something that this
defendant failed to do, since reliance on counsel's mistake of law should be
treated no differently than defendant's mistake of law.
77. Sayre, supra note 32, at 685.
78. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS itself provides an illustration of
this approach. On the question of burdens, the Second Restatement clearly did
not require the defendant to prove justification in all cases where mere
intentional interference had been shown. But the drafters were unwilling to
move decisively in the other direction. Their scheme (with the choice of the
words "improperly" and "subject to liability" in § 766) was meant to commu-
nicate neutrality on the complex question of burdens. See RESTATEMENT (SE-
cOND) OF TORTS, ch. 37, at 4-7 (1979). At the same time, the Restatement's
general test for determining improperness would seem to leave open the
question of improperness in a better deal case. Id. § 767. The drafters, however,
left no doubt in the comments that they regarded interference in the better deal
cases as improper. Id. § 768 cmts. a & h.
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gested, in the passage quoted above, an independent
wrongfulness requirement of the sort advocated by Dobbs
and Perlman, which would make room for the better deal
cases. This is a narrower view of liability than that ex-
pressed in the Restatement comments. The court, however,
went on to say that "w]e therefore adopt the Restatement's
required showing of an 'improper' interference."79 It remains
to be seen which way the Arizona court will go when it faces
the issue squarely.
In a 1978 case, Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate
Insurance Co.,8  which has come to stand for a narrowing of
interference liability,8 the Oregon Supreme Court said that
liability for "intentional interference with contractual or
other economic relations" would require that the inter-
ference be
wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
itself. Defendant's liability may arise from improper motives or
from the use of improper means. They may be wrongful by reason
of a statute or other regulation, or a recognized rule of common
law, or perhaps an established standard of a trade or profession.
No question of privilege arises unless the interference would be
wrongful but for the privilege; it becomes an issue only if the acts
charged would be tortious on the part of an unprivileged
defendant.8
2
The court said in a footnote, "Commonly included
among improper means are violence, threats or other
intimidation, deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, un-
founded litigation, defamation, or disparaging falsehood."83
Perlman regarded this case favorably, referring to it as a
"departure from ... traditional analysis" that would have
placed upon the interfering party the burden of proving
"some overriding justification for his interference.""4 It
certainly reduces the threat of liability in the better deal
cases. A number of states have now followed Oregon,
requiring that the plaintiff show that the interference was
79. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1043.
80. Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978).
81. See Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 649 (Alaska 1991); United
Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Mass. 1990); Perlman,
supra note 20, at 66.
82. Top Service, 582 P.2d at 1371 (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 1371 n.11.
84. Perlman, supra note 20, at 66.
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improper " 'beyond the fact of interference itself.' );85
The confidence that one can place in these opinions as
support for the absence of liability in the better deal cases
should not be overestimated. While the relevant passages in
these opinions clearly speak about the issue of the
improperness of mere interference with an enforceable con-
tract, the facts of these cases do not raise the issue directly.
The cases involve interference with a prospective contract or
with an at-will contract, about which there is something
approaching consensus that offering a better deal is
privileged, justified or not improper. 6 Or they involve inter-
ference with contract where the defendant's actions are
covered by an established privilege (other than the offering
85. United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Mass. 1990)
(quoting Top Service, 582 P.2d at 1371); see Blake v. Levy, 464 A.2d 52, 55
(Conn. 1983); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah
1982). Cf Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 649 (Alaska 1991) (citing
"Oregon rule" as one that "may be desirable" but "not necessary to decide
whether it should be adopted at present").
86. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Meml Hosp. 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)
(involving at-will contract); Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate Ins., Co., 582
P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978) (involving interference with a prospective contract); King
v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 1994) (involving at-will contract); Blake v.
Levy, 464 A.2d 52 (Conn. 1983) (involving interference with business relations).
In King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488 (Mass. 1994), a case involving
interference with contract, the court held that "[olne of the elements of
intentional interference with contractual relations is improper motive or
means," and that "[t]he motivation of personal gain, including financial gain" is
generally "not enough to satisfy the improper interference requirement." Id. at
494-95 (citing United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20 (1990)).
This certainly appears to give teeth to the improper motive or means re-
quirement, but it should be noted that the plaintiff here was an employee suing
the president and shareholders of his employer for breach of his at-will em-
ployment contract. Ordinarily, on such facts, the defense would be privilege and
the reply would be that malice defeats privilege. While the court is not
analyzing it in these terms, a high hurdle of improperness seems appropriate
because the plaintiff must not only show improper interference but must defeat
established privileges.
See United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 1982) for an
illustration of the breadth of the privilege to compete in cases of interference
with prospective contract, where the defendant's luring away of plaintiffs
customers was found to be permissible even though his motive was in part to
put the plaintiff out of business. And note that this is in a state that appears to
lean toward the sanctity of contract. See Langeland v. Farmers State Bank of
Trimon, 319 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Minn. 1982). The privilege is not always and
everywhere construed so broadly. See, e.g., Wear-ever Aluminum, Inc. v.
Townecraft Industries, Inc., 182 A.2d 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962)
(involving liability for luring away at-will employees).
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of a better deal)." None of these cases involved the simple
offering of a better deal. The Idaho court, for example,
expressly adopted the Top Service approach, requiring
interference to be independently wrongful, but it did so only
with respect to the tort of interference with prospective
contract."8 In the same case it held that a plaintiff in an
interference with contract case need not show wrongful-
ness; that after a showing of intentional interference it was
up to the defendant to show justification-the determin-
ation of which would be a jury question. Thus, there is a
certain instability in these decisions. The tendency to view
the question of the improperness of interference as a binary
one-that interference is either improper or it is not,
regardless of the nature of the underlying breach-will put
enormous stress on the new rule the first time the court
encounters a case of mere interference causing a wrongful
breach.
The California Supreme Court prominently cited
Perlman's article in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear
Stearns & Co.,89 which held that a financial advisor could
not be subject to interference liability for advising someone
to seek a declaratory judgment on the right to terminate a
contract. The court viewed the use of the interference torts
as an attempt to make "an end run around the limitations
87. See Ran Corp. v. Hudesman, 823 P.2d 646, 649 n.4 (Alaska 1991) ('The
Oregon rule may be desirable. However, it is not necessary to decide whether it
should be adopted at present because the direct financial interest privilege...
applies .... ."). The case that comes closest to being a mere interference case is
United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1990), in which
the interferer was a lease consultant whose advice to a client that was a lessee
of equipment led the client to breach a lease and enter into a lease with a
different lessor. The trial court was held to have appropriately directed a
verdict for the defendant/consultant as there was no evidence that he had used
any improper means. The court said that the consultant's "apparent motives
were to benefit his customers and himself financially." Id. at 24. If the
consultant had induced the breaching party to breach his contract with the
plaintiff and do business with the consultant himself, this would have been a
prototypical better deal case. In the actual case, the consultant's actions were
less directly self-interested, and they had about them at least a hint of the
privilege to offer advice.
88. See Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Food, Inc., 824 P.2d 841
(Idaho 1991); see also Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304
(Utah 1982) (discussing primarily intentional interference with prospective
economic relations).
89. 791 P.2d 587 (Cal. 1990).
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on the tort of malicious prosecution."9" In this context, the
court said, "[g]iven the criticism of these causes of action
and the dangers inherent in imposing tort liability for
competitive business practices, we have no motivation to
expand these torts so that they begin to threaten the right
of free access to the courts."9' In the same paragraph the
court referred explicitly to Perlman's article and the threat
that the tort of interference with contract poses to efficient
breach of contract.92 All of this falls far short of an
announcement by the court that it is about to overrule its
precedents that allow liability in better deal cases.93 It does,
however, suggest at least an openness to arguments that
such cases should be overruled.
Justice Mosk wrote an extensive concurring opinion in
a 1995 case which addressed the issue directly: "Reason
supports the conclusion that, even when there is a breach of
contract, the interfered-with party should not be preferred
over the interfering party: the breach may be 'efficient.' "s"
Later in the same opinion he wrote, "A question that raises
itself at this juncture is whether the related tort of
intentional interference with contract . . . should be
reformulated to require objective, and unlawful, conduct or
consequences. 95  Justice Mosk let the question go
90. Id. at 598.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 597-98 & n.20; see also Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi
Arabia Ltd., 869 P.2d 454, 463 (Cal. 1994) (referring to potentially efficient and
socially desirable breaches of contract).
93. Justice Traynor's opinion in Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier stated
unequivocally that inducing breach by offering a better deal was tortious:
It is well established.., that a person is not justified in inducing a
breach of contract simply because he is in competition with one of the
parties to the contract and seeks to further his own economic
advantage at the expense of the other. Whatever interest society has in
encouraging free and open competition by means not in themselves
unlawful, contractual stability is generally accepted as of greater im-
portance than competitive freedom. Competitive freedom, however, is
of sufficient importance to justify one competitor in inducing a third
party to forsake another competitor if no contractual relationship
exists between the latter two .... A party may not, however, under the
guise of competition actively and affirmatively induce the breach of a
competitor's contract in order to secure an economic advantage over
that competitor.
Imperial Ice v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631, 633 (Cal. 1941) (citations omitted).
94. Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 902 P.2d 740, 755 (Cal. 1995)
(Mosk, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 761 n.9. The opinion goes on to say that this question "need not be
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unanswered.
The New York Court of Appeals also seemed to be
pulling back on the reins of the interference torts in 1996,
in NBT Bancorp Inc. v. Fleet/Norstar Financial Group,
Inc.9" Sixteen years earlier, the Court of Appeals had
appeared to be taking a very broad view of the tort in
Guard-Life Corp. v. Parker Hardware Manufacuring Corp.97
That opinion included an exegesis of Sections 766, 767 and
768 of the Second Restatement, then newly adopted, that
surely left some careful readers with the impression that
the court was endorsing the Restatement's expansive view
of the tort.98 In NBT Bancorp, however, plaintiffs counsel
was chided for suggesting any such thing. The court stated
that "[t]he Guard-Life holding, as well as its reasoning, put
to rest NBT's assertion that the Court in that case was
adopting the test propounded in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 766.""9 Section 766 of the Restatement speaks of
interference "with the performance of a contract,"1"0 and it
does not require that there be a breach of the contract. The
New York court held in NBT Bancorp that there could be no
tortious interference with contract unless there was a
breach of contract and that there could be no tortious
interference with prospective contractual relations unless
the interference was caused by some wrongful means.
The court said that it "[stood] by [its] considered
precedents."'' It would be difficult, however, to read the
Guard-Life and NBT Bancorp opinions back to back
without noticing a distinct difference in the court's ap-
proach to the interference torts in the two cases-
particularly in the respect accorded to the Restatement's
formulation of interference with contract. For what it is
worth, in NBT Bancorp, immediately after the just-quoted
reference to the court's "considered precedents," the court
said in a footnote that "[tihe subject of tortious interference
with contract continues to excite scholarly commentary,
much of it suggesting that the tort be limited so as to
addressed here" and that the question might be answered either affirmatively
or negatively. Id.
96. 664 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1996).
97. 406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1980).
98. Id. at 448-50.
99. NBTBancorp, 664 N.E.2d at 496 n. 1.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979) (emphasis added).
101. NBTBancorp, 664 N.E.2d at 497.
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protect lawful competition."' °2
One might hope that the court's backing away from the
tone of Guard-Life would signal an openness to arguments
that a privilege of economic interest should be recognized
that is broad enough to include the better deal cases. °3
While the NBT Bancorp decision does not rest on this point,
the court seemed to go out of its way to dash any such hope.
The court focused on Guard-Life's holding that interference
with prospective contractual relations requires employment
of some wrongful means. But it also referred to Guard-Life's
interference-with-contract holding that "persuasion to
breach alone, as by an offer of better terms, has been
sufficient to impose liability on one who thereby interferes
with performance."' ° This reaffirmation of Guard-Life's
better deal holding is of course dictum, but it does not
suggest a court that is seeking to reconsider the point.
There is certainly a new, hard look being taken at the
interference torts in many of the high courts. But inter-
ference with contract continues to be characterized by many
courts in such a way that offering a better deal is a tort.
And even the courts that have confidently announced a
requirement of wrongfulness beyond mere interference have
done so in cases that were not better deal cases. It is far
from certain that those courts can be counted on to follow
through with their announced wrongfulness requirements
when they are finally faced with cases that involve mere
interference that causes a wrongful breach. If the choice is
viewed as a binary one-mere interference is either im-
proper or it is not-then there is a good chance that even
the courts that have announced a wrongfulness require-
ment will revert to the old orthodoxy. Faced with a case in
102. Id. at 497 n.2 (citations omitted).
103. New York recognizes a privilege of economic interest, but the desire to
do business does not qualify. In Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1996),
which was decided the same day as NBT Bancorp, the New York court held that
a person who induces the breach of a contract while acting to protect a vested
economic interest (here a majority interest in a corporation) acts under a
qualified privilege and will not be found liable for tortious interference with
contract absent "a showing of either malice on the one hand, or fraudulent or
illegal means on the other." Id. at 157 (citation omitted).
104. Guard-Life, 406 N.E.2d at 450-51 (citations omitted). The Court of
Appeals in NBT Bancorp mistakenly said that it "affirmed an award to
plaintiff' on the interference-with-contract part of the Guard-Life case. In fact,




which liability for mere interference is compelling because
the underlying breach is wrongful-a notion that will be de-
veloped in the next section-these courts may fall back to
the orthodox position that mere interference is improper in
and of itself.
But the choice is not a binary one. The California and
New York courts, for example, can harmonize the inter-
ference torts with the remedies principles of contract law
without overturning their better deal precedents, which ap-
pear to hold that mere interference is improper in and of
itself. Those precedents present reasonable cases for lia-
bility, but they do not demonstrate that mere interference
is improper. Rather, they demonstrate that mere inter-
ference may be improper when it causes a wrongful breach.
The next section develops in some detail the notion of a
wrongful breach of contract, the mere interference with
which may be found improper.
II. WRONGFUL BREACHES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
A. Prologue: The Right to Breach
"The duty to keep a contract at common law means a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep
it,-and nothing else.""5 This famous characterization of
contract obligations by Holmes leads to the heart of the
riddle of tortious interference. If a person is free to breach a
contract and pay damages, why should it be tortious for a
third party to induce the contract party to do what she is
free to do? But are we justified in concluding, from the fact
that contract law imposes only compensatory damages, that
it is not wrong for a contract party to breach? Such a
conclusion is certainly not justified when it comes to
breaches that would lead to orders of specific perfor-
mance. 6 A party is only free to breach in such a case if the
aggrieved party fails to assert her right to compel
performance. But what about those breaches that lead only
to the imposition of money damages?
105. Holmes, supra note 4, at 462.
106. Holmes, of course, recognized that there were cases "in which equity
[would] grant an injunction," but he "hardly [thought] it advisable to shape
general theory from the exception ... ." Id. at 462-63.
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I have said that contract law encourages certain
breaches; I have steered clear of saying that contract law"means to encourage" certain breaches, but putting it that
way raises the point directly. Is it possible that this feature
of contract law-the incentive to breach in certain cases
that flows from contract damages being substitutional and
compensatory-is an accident or a flaw? Contract law is so
structured that certain breaches are encouraged. But what
reason do we have for thinking that this fact of
encouragement is a feature of contract law that we should
regard in a positive light? Isn't the very fact of the
twentieth century tortious interference orthodoxy powerful
evidence that contract law's stopping short at compensation
should not be taken as encouragement? Why should we not
believe the comment of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
that says that one who breaches a contract is a "wrong-
doer"?10
One can imagine three positions that might be taken
with respect to these questions. The first would run some-
thing like this: yes, one has the option under the law of
contracts either to perform or to breach and pay damages.
But what appears to be encouragement of certain breaches
is simply an unintended consequence of damages being
justly limited to an amount that compensates the aggrieved
party. The fact that the breacher can get away with paying
only compensation does not mean that the breacher has not
committed a wrong. We should say that a contracting party
has the option either to perform or to commit a wrong by
breaching and paying damages. According to position
number one, the remedies rules of contract are fine as they
are, and there is simply no conflict between these rules and
a law of tortious interference that regards mere
interference with contract as improper.
The problem with this position is that it does not
account for contract remedies being generally substitutional
and not specific. If there is still an unremedied wrong after
substitutional damages are paid, then the general remedy
should be specific performance. If we are unwilling to do
away with contract law's insistence on damages as the
presumptive remedy, presumably that is because there is
some advantage to allowing the breaching party to pay only
compensatory damages. Anyone who believed in such an
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. v (1979).
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advantage should be unwilling to undercut it with an
interference tort that deters some of the very same breaches
that contract law encourages. Anyone who does not believe
that there is such an advantage would have no reason to
support contract remedies as they are.
The second position is that the rules of contract
remedies should be changed to make specific performance
the general rule. One might take this position for economic
reasons, believing that a specific performance rule is at
least as likely to lead to efficient behavior as the current
rule, or simply because one believes that breaching is
wrong. An interference tort that regards mere interference
with contract as improper would be consistent with such a
view.
This is a reasonable position. The assumption of this
Article, however, is that such a fundamental change in the
principles of contract law is not on the horizon. If there
were a referendum on the subject, I would vote to keep the
current regime of contract remedies rather than to change
to a specific performance regime. I lean toward believing
that there is an advantage to allowing the breaching party
to pay only compensatory damages, but I firmly intend to
stay out of that debate in this Article. My purpose in de-
scribing the rationale for dividing contract claims into
damage claims and specific performance claims"8 is not to
win anyone over to support the current remedies regime.
Rather, my purpose is to convince readers that as long as
we have the current remedies regime which encourages
certain breaches of contract, it makes no sense for tort law
to undercut it by holding someone liable who encourages
such a breach. Such a conflict would be understandable if
we had contract courts warring with tort courts over the
desirability of efficient breaches-but, of course, we do not.
The third position is that the current division of
contract law cases into damages cases and specific
performance cases makes sense because it encourages
certain breaches. This argument, sketched out below,
serves as a basis for understanding why breaches that lead
to specific performance and, more generally, breaches for
which there is no adequate remedy in damages should be
regarded as wrongful.
My rejection of the first position, my leaning away from
108. See infra notes 111-21 and accompanying text.
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the second and my embracing of the third all turn on the
idea that the split between damages and specific perfor-
mance cases is a sensible one in light of the incentives it
creates for contracting parties to behave efficiently. Section
B sketches out this argument in some detail, describing the
split between specific performance and damages cases and
the way that parties are encouraged to perform or not
depending on whether performance would be efficient. The
section is not intended as a brief for the current remedies
regime. Rather, it is an attempt to show, particularly for
those who have not followed closely the law and economics
debate on contract remedies, how the current regime works,
the nature of some of the benefits that flow from it, and the
argument that as long as we have such a regime, tort law
should not be undercutting it. If we have a presumptive
rule of damages, and we do, then it makes no sense to
undercut its only advantage-which is that it encourages
certain breaches. The breach that would lead to specific
performance emerges from Section B as a breach that is
wrongful. Contract law stands ready to prevent such a
breach.
Sections C and D explore two categories of breach in
which contract law recognizes, explicitly in one case and
obscurely in the second, that a damage remedy is in some
way inadequate even though it is the best that contract law
can do. First are those cases of breach for which money
damages are not an adequate remedy but for which specific
performance is not available. The law of contracts has
struggled with these cases. We will see that the law of
tortious interference was born directly out of this struggle.
Even though the law of contracts refuses to compel
performance in cases of this kind it is clear that the law
does not seek to protect the breaching party's "right" to
breach in this fashion. Historically, equity had jurisdiction
over such breaches because the common law did not
manage to reach just outcomes. The reasons that the law is
unable or chooses not to fashion specific relief in these cases
do not translate into an endorsement of, or even an
expression of indifference toward, the breacher's actions.
The second group of cases, the subject of Section D,
involves cases of bad faith breach. American law insists on
preserving a person's right to resist legitimate claims and to
force claimants to sue. A breaching party can deny the
existence or enforceability of valid obligations under a
677
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contract, forcing the other party to sue, without the risk of
paying the aggrieved party's attorneys' fees. The breaching
party must steer clear of court-imposed sanctions, but there
is plenty of leeway for fairly outrageous "stonewalling"
behavior on the part of breaching parties that goes un-
penalized under the combined effect of contract law and the
American Rule on attorneys' fees." 9 Just as there are cases
in which the breaching party cannot be said to have a right
to breach even though the law of contracts fails to impose
any penalty beyond compensatory damages, so there are
cases of bad faith breach in which the breaching party is
able to get away with reprehensible conduct that is not
penalized by the rules of contract law. We will explore
below why it is that contract law is incapable of identifying
these cases and why tort law does not suffer from the same
incapacity.
B. Specific Performance
1. The Bifurcation of Contract Remedies. The clearest
category of wrongful breach comprises those breaches for
which the law provides the remedy of specific performance.
This is the only category of wrongful breach I will identify
that is actually recognized by the law of contract in terms of
outcomes. This category will be explored in more detail
than would be necessary to show that the specific perfor-
mance case involves a wrongful breach in the sense that
contract law stands ready to compel performance, a
proposition that is intuitively clear. This detailed explor-
ation demonstrates that the rationale that underlies the
special treatment of the specific performance breach applies
equally to the two other categories of wrongful breach.
While those other categories are not treated any differently
by the law of contracts in terms of case outcomes, they
should nevertheless be understood to involve wrongful
breaches for the same reason that the specific performance
breaches are wrongful. It is due to other characteristics of
these breaches-characteristics that are irrelevant to the
improperness of a third party's interference-that contract
109. See Jonathan K Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of
Advocacy: A Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 891, 891-901 (1984); Comment, Controlling the Malicious De-
fendant, 2 STAN. L. REV. 184, 185-87 (1949).
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law is unable to fashion a remedy that is responsive to the
wrongfulness of the breach.
If a breaching contract party is ipso facto a wrongdoer,
there would be nothing to stop the law of contracts from
making the remedy of specific performance generally
available."' Instead, contract law draws a distinction
between those cases in which the aggrieved party's contract
right is protected by a liability rule, which awards damages
based on the court's (or jury's) valuation of damage suffered
by the aggrieved party on account of the breach, and those
in which the right is protected by a property rule, which
gives the aggrieved party a right to compel performance of
the contract, a right which the aggrieved party is free to sell
to the breaching party at a negotiated price."'
It is possible for a party to opt out of performance under
either rule. Under the damage rule a party can breach and
pay damages; under the specific performance rule a party
who wishes to escape performance can do so by negotiating
with the other party for a release. The effect of this is that
contracts can be "breached" in either case. In the first case
it is the court that determines damages; in the second it is
the aggrieved party that determines the amount of
"damages" through negotiation.
Thus, there are two different routes to efficient non-
performance. In the damage case, a party can breach and
enter into a better deal, paying damages in the amount that
would be determined by the court to make the aggrieved
party whole. By this route the breaching party keeps
whatever amount remains (the surplus) after compensating
the aggrieved party. In the specific performance case, a
party who wishes to enter into a better deal can negotiate a
release at a price that at least makes the aggrieved party
whole (we may assume, since the aggrieved party has
voluntarily parted with her right to compel performance).
By this route the party wishing to enter into the better deal
110. Specific performance is generally available in some other legal systems.
See Dawson, Specific Performance in France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV.
495 (1959).
111. For the classic exposition of the distinction between liability and
property rules, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV.
1089, 1106-10 (1972). The distinction continues to be a vital one. See Saul
Levmore, Symposium: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: A
Twenty-Five Year Retrospective, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2150-53 (1997).
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keeps the surplus minus whatever portion of the surplus
the aggrieved party manages to negotiate as payment be-
yond the compensation that would have just made her
whole.
The crucial question for understanding the bifurcation
of contract remedies is this: why is the law of contracts
willing to allow the court to determine the aggrieved party's
damages and the breaching party to keep the entire surplus
in one set of cases, while in another set of cases it leaves the
determination of damages in the hands of the aggrieved
party, which leads to a division of the surplus between the
contracting parties? There is ongoing scholarly debate a-
bout this question. Some argue that contract law should be
reformed to grant specific performance as a general remedy
for breach."'These are serious arguments; if the law of con-
tracts were so changed, then much of the criticism of the
law of tortious interference with which this Article is
concerned would evaporate. The broad view of tortious
interference liability, that mere interference is improper,
would be consistent with this kind of general specific
performance rule in contract."' Others argue that contract
law should continue its practice of providing a damage
remedy for an important class of breaches. It is not
necessary for the purposes of this Article that this
controversy be resolved. Contract law might someday
change to provide a universal rule of specific performance,
but it shows no signs of doing so now. 15
112. See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance:
Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984);
Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and
the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981); Alan Schwartz, The
Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979); see also Harold
Greenberg, Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code: "A More Liberal Attitude" in the "Grand Style", 17 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 321 (1982).
113. See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 20-23 (1989).
114. See Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of
Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1365 (1982); Anthony T. Kronman, Specific
Performance, 45 U. CmI. L. REV. 351 (1978); POSNER, supra note 5; see also
Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient
Breach, 61 So. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
115. Douglas Laycock, in The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103
HARV. L. REv. 687 (1990), appears at times to be arguing that contract law has
moved to a general rule of specific performance. But he in fact makes repeated
references to a class of cases involving "the loss of fungible goods or services in
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The law currently provides that in a significant class of
cases the breaching party can breach, pay damages and
keep the surplus. The law of tortious interference attacks
this by making the third party offeror of a better deal a
tortfeasor. Tort damages may be significantly greater than
contract damages, putting the surplus at risk. But even if
damages were no greater than contract damages, the
breacher and the tortfeasor would be unable to predict
whether the aggrieved party would sue the breacher in
contract or the tortfeasor in tort. This could be overcome by
the breacher agreeing to indemnify the tortfeasor for any
tort damages, but such an agreement may well be un-
enforceable as an agreement that contemplates the com-
mission of a tort."' This drives careful would-be better
dealers to have the prospective breacher buy a release from
the contract. Thus, what is accomplished by the bifurcation
of contract remedies is undone by the law of tortious inter-
ference.
2. An Example of an Efficient Breach. An example of a
breach of contract that arises from the offering of a better
deal will serve to illustrate some of these ideas. In this
example A and B are parties to a contract. A is the Ag-
grieved party if the contract is breached, and B is the
Breaching party or the party that is considering whether or
not to breach. T is the potential Tortfeasor, the party who
offers the better deal to B.
A and B enter into an enforceable contract, with A
promising to employ B for one year at a salary of $200 per
week. B later learns that the services she agreed to provide
to A would be worth $300 per week in the relevant market.
That means that if B were to breach, A would have to pay
someone else $300 per week and B would be answerable to
A in damages for $100 per week. Now suppose that B has
certain skills that are of no interest to A but which make T
willing to pay B $400 per week. T discusses the matter with
B and learns of the contract between A and B. The contract
notwithstanding, T offers to pay B $400 per week if B will
agree to indemnify T for any amount (up to $100 per week)
that T might have to pay A if T is found liable to A for
interference with A and B's contract. The breach of contract
an orderly market" for which damages are adequate. See, e.g., id. at 695.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 192 & cmt. b (1981).
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that T encourages B to make is an efficient breach. If B
breaches, A can hire a replacement and be made whole by
damages of $100. B is better off by $100 per week after
compensating A, T is better off by getting the desired
contract with B, and A, who has been fully compensated, is
no worse off. The law of contract remedies reaches an
efficient result: damages of $100 per week. But tort law, as
currently articulated by the majority of courts, interferes
with this result.
Assume that B has accepted T's offer and breached her
contract with A. Even though, as a matter of contract law,
B is free to breach this contract and pay damages to A, T's
inducing of B to breach it is a tort."' B would be liable to A
in contract. But T would also be liable to A in tort for
damages not necessarily bounded by A's contract dam-
ages,' and T and B have no way of predicting which of
them A will sue. Moreover, the agreement between T and B
that attempts to distribute this uncertain liability is
unenforceable, and indeed the entire contract of
employment between T and B is unenforceable because it
contemplates the inducement of a breach."9
None of this would be troubling if we regarded B's
breach as a wrong. Contract law, however, does not regard
B's behavior as wrongful. The bifurcation of contract
remedies contemplates that B be permitted to breach and
pay damages. The effect of tort law is to undercut this and
force B to act as if the general rule of contracts were specific
performance. T is unlikely to contract with B unless B first
negotiates a release from A, pursuant to which A is likely to
demand compensation of $100 plus some portion of B's $100
surplus. Contract law would protect A's contract right by a
liability rule; tort law overrides this and protects it by a
property rule.
117. It is possible that T would escape liability by being found to have
acquiesced in the breach rather than to have induced it. See Frontier Cos. of
Alaska, Inc. v. Jack White Co., 818 P.2d 645, 650-51 (Alaska 1991); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. n (1979). That somewhat uncertain
escape hatch would be unavailable here as T appears to be the instigator.
118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A.
119. See Perlman, supra note 20, at 88; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 192, 194 (1981). The problem is not that A can recover twice for the
same damages; she cannot. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(2). The
problem is that B and T cannot know in advance whom A will sue, and any
agreement between B and T for indemnification would be unenforceable.
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3. The Rationale for the Bifurcation of Remedies. The
remainder of this section is a brief summary of the
rationale for the distinction made by contract law between
rights that are protected by a property rule and those
protected only by a liability rule. This summary is written
particularly for those readers who have not followed the
debates in the law and economics literature on the nature of
remedies. Whether or not one is generally sympathetic to
economic arguments in the law, for an understanding of the
bifurcation of contract remedies it is crucial to have an
intuitive grasp of the insights that flow from economic
analysis.
It is important to note at the outset that the bifurcation
bears no direct relationship to the line between cases of
efficient and inefficient breach. Some breaches that lead
only to awards of damages are efficient; others are not.
Some breaches that lead to awards of specific performance
are efficient; others are not. The contract remedies rules
provide incentives for the parties to reach efficient out-
comes. In the damages cases a party is given the incentive
to breach when the breach is efficient. In the specific
performance cases a party is given the incentive to nego-
tiate for a release when non-performance would be efficient.
A contract that is subject to a liability rule amounts to
nothing more than an option to perform or to pay damages.
Under such a rule, if B is offered a deal by T that is so
attractive that B can breach her contract with A, com-
pensate A for her damages and still come out ahead, then
no one is harmed by permitting this breach. In our example,
B can breach, compensate A, and still enjoy a $100 surplus.
Notice, however, that even under a specific performance
rule the parties might well reach an efficient outcome, but
by a different route. Under a specific performance rule A
could compel B to perform, and T could approach A and
negotiate B's release from the contract (or B could approach
A and negotiate her own release). Neither A nor B would be
harmed, T would get B's services, and the $100 surplus
would be distributed among the parties depending upon the
outcome of the negotiations.
If both rules lead to an efficient outcome, why does the
law of contracts apply one rule to some cases and another to
the rest? First imagine that we enforced all contracts by
award of damages. If the promised good or service were
commercial or fungible, we could be comfortable that the
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value attached to the transaction by the promisee would be
the same as the value attached by the market.2 ' In such a
case a liability rule would be sufficient to protect the
promisee's rights. If the subject of the promise were some-
how unique (for example, land, unique goods or unique
personal services) we would be less comfortable with a
liability rule since there would be no market upon which to
measure the value and no market upon which to change the
damage award into the equivalent of that for which the
parties contracted. In this case a property rule would more
effectively protect the invaded right of the promisee. The
property rule honors one of the fundamental premises of
contract law: that no one is better positioned than the
aggrieved party to judge the value she placed on the rights
she acquired when she entered into the contract. The
property rule, or specific performance rule, leads to the
enforcement of contracts by courts without their having to
second guess the values placed on the contract by the
parties. The damages cases, in contrast, are those cases in
which the existence of markets makes the determination of
damages relatively cheap and error free.
The foregoing explains why we might choose to enforce
certain contracts with specific performance, but it does not
tell us why we do not enforce all contracts with specific
performance. Even when a contract involves fungible goods
or services there is still some cost to determining damages
and some risk of error. What benefits outweigh these costs?
The benefit is that we avoid transaction costs associated
with the specific performance rule. If there is someone in
the world that values the goods or services that are the
subject of the contract more than the buyer under the
contract, then we would like to get the goods or services to
her. In the cases that we are considering here (cases
involving fungible things or services) the sellers of those
items are more likely on average to be the cheaper
searchers for the higher valuers of those items. The damage
rule provides greater and more certain compensation to
sellers who succeed in finding higher valuers than would
the specific performance rule: greater, because the seller
120. Or, in the event that the promisee placed some higher-than-market
value on a truly fungible good or service, then compensation based on market
value would enable the promisee to go into the market and obtain the special
value through a substitute transaction.
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captures the entire surplus under the damage rule rather
than having to split it with the buyer; more certain because
the specific performance rule leads to negotiations that
sometimes break down for strategic reasons.
It is worth observing again that the line between the
damage cases and the specific performance cases does not
coincide with the line between efficient and inefficient
breach. The determination that a breaching party must pay
damages is not a determination that the breach was
efficient. Nor is a determination that a contract is
specifically enforceable in connection with a particular
breach equivalent to a finding that the breach was in-
efficient. Rather, in the damage cases, allowing the
breaching party to decide whether or not to breach, taking
account of expectation damages, is thought to be more
likely to lead to the efficient outcome than the alternative
rule. In the specific performance cases, giving the aggrieved
party an entitlement to enforce the contract specifically or
to bargain it away, is thought to be more likely to lead to
the efficient outcome than the alternative rule."
The bifurcation of contract remedies provides a trans-
actional infrastructure that guides contracting parties to-
ward efficient transactions. Contract rights are protected in
certain cases by a property rule, and in these cases the
breaching party commits a wrong by failing to perform
without negotiating a release. In other cases the breaching
party is free to breach and pay damages. If the rationale
behind the property/liability split could be realized com-
pletely, then the breaching party should be free to breach in
any case in which damages rather than specific perfor-
mance would be awarded for the breach. As the next two
sections demonstrate, contract law fails in two classes of
cases. These are cases in which the aggrieved party's con-
tract right is not adequately protected by a liability rule,
but contract law has found no other satisfactory way to pro-
tect it. The result is that a breaching party can get away
with breaching and paying damages even though her
breach is wrongful.
121. For a case in which Judge Posner explicitly analyzes the availability of
specific performance in these terms, see Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property
Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992).
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C. No Adequate Damages
The prerequisite for the equity courts' jurisdiction in a
suit for specific performance was that there be no adequate
remedy available at law. The inadequacy of damages con-
tinues to be a necessary but not sufficient condition of an
order of specific performance. Even though damages may
not be adequate there are a number of reasons why a court
might decline to award specific performance.
The primary example of a contract obligation that will
not be enforced specifically is the contract for unique per-
sonal services. A promise to sing the role of Isolde at the
Met or to play quarterback for the Dallas Cowboys will not
be enforced specifically. In these cases, the aggrieved party
does not have an adequate remedy at law in damages, and
it is that failure that opens the door to the remedies of"equity," of which specific performance is one. The problem
is that equity would not, and modern courts will not, order
someone to sing or to quarterback. The rationale often
given is that a court cannot enforce such an order because
the breaching party would have to be ordered not just to
sing or to quarterback, but to do so with artistry, and what
court has the "exquisite sensibility" necessary to craft such
an order or to judge the artist in contempt of it? 2 It is also
sometimes said that compelling personal service would
"run[ I afoul of the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition
against involuntary servitude."
23
122. See De Rivafinoli v. Corsetti, 4 Paige Ch. 263, 270 (N.Y. 1833).
I am not aware that any officer of this court has that perfect knowledge
of the Italian language, or possesses that exquisite sensibility in the
auricular nerve, which is necessary to understand and to enjoy with a
proper zest the peculiar beauties of the Italian opera, so fascinating to
the fashionable world.
Id.; 5A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964).
123. Beverly Glen Music, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 224 Cal.
Rptr. 260, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Involuntary servitude and a court order of
specific performance may seem to be miles apart, but they are chillingly close.
Immediately after the Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery as a legal
institution in the United States, slave owners turned to contract as a means of
maintaining control over their former slaves. The person who enticed away a
southern plantation owner's newly hired slaves-turned-servants was liable in
damages. Salter v. Howard, 43 Ga. 601 (1871). If orders of specific performance
for contracts of personal service had been available, the passage of the
Thirteenth Amendment would have been far less significant to the workers on
the plantation of Mr. John Howard in Houston County, Georgia, during 1866.
Id. at 602 (referring to testimony by the plaintiff, Mr. Howard, that he had "said
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The breach of contract that underlay the first modern
Anglo-American tortious interference case was a breach by
an opera singer of just such a contract for which the remedy
of damages was not adequate. In 1852, Johanna Wagner,
cantatrice of the court of His Majesty the King of Prussia,
repudiated her agreement to sing exclusively at Her
Majesty's Theatre in London by accepting an offer to sing
for higher pay at Covent Garden. In the case of Lumley v.
Wagner, 4 the Lord Chancellor upheld an injunction barring
Ms. Wagner from singing at Covent Garden. This case
stands in the contract treatises for the proposition that
while a court will not order the specific performance of a
contract for personal service, it will issue an injunction in
appropriate circumstances preventing the breaching party
from performing the unique service for anyone other than
the aggrieved party during the contract term.'25 The case of
Lumley v. Wagner was not about tortious interference, and
it is usually not mentioned in connection with the history of
the tort. But the seminal tortious interference case, Lumley
v. Gye, 126 arose from the very same breach of contract.
It appears that Ms. Wagner was not persuaded by the
injunction to repent from her breach and sing at Her
Majesty's Theatre. Mr. Lumley sued again, this time in a
court of law rather than equity, against Mr. Gye, the
promoter at Covent Garden. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant not only procured Ms. Wagner's breach of
contract, but enticed her "after certain proceedings in
equity ... to continue her default for the residue of the
term."127 The Court of Queen's Bench held "that an action
lies for maliciously procuring a breach of contract to give
exclusive personal services for a time certain . . . and
produces damage[s]. ",28
Lumley v. Gye marked the birth of the modern
interference tort. While it involved a contractual breach by
a party that was not free to breach-that is, the underlying
breach was one for which equity would have ordered spe-
cific performance if only it could have-the judges did
he would send the sheriff after [his former slaves] and [the defendant] too").
124. 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852).
125. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 855-56; JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M.
PERiLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 667 n.49 (3d ed. 1987).
126. 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 2 El. & B1. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
127. 118 Eng. Rep. at 760, 2 El. & B1. at 245 (Coleridge, J., dissenting).
128. 118 Eng. Rep. at 749, 2 El. & Bl. at 216.
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nothing to highlight this aspect of the case. Lumley v. Gye
did involve the breach of a contract for unique personal
services. Had the tort remained limited to such cases, Mr.
Gye's interference might have come to be understood as
improper because it caused Ms. Wagner to breach wrong-
fully, or in a way that left Mr. Lumley with no adequate
remedy.
Related to the personal service cases are cases involving
complex tasks such as construction projects. Courts have
often declined to grant specific performance in cases such as
these because administering or supervising the orders
would be difficult.'29 A related reason for declining to award
specific performance is uncertainty or indefiniteness in the
contractual provision sought to be enforced. Such
uncertainty may be present even though the contract is
definite enough to be enforceable. The obligation to mod-
ernize and expand a steel mill may be definite enough to be
enforceable, but the obligation looks quite different when
the judge sits down to draft an order to compel the builder's
performance. 3 °
Finally, there are cases in which courts will decline to
award specific performance because the plaintiff has
"unclean hands" or has failed herself "to do equity," or
because the contract itself or the manner in which the
aggrieved party sought to enforce it is unfair or oppressive.
In these cases the aggrieved party has forfeited the right to
have its obligation protected by a property rule. Unlike the
cases of wrongful breach in which the court either compels
performance, or would like to compel performance but
cannot, here one has the sense that the court denies specific
relief with some enthusiasm and would award damages
with some reluctance.
We will see below that the no-adequate-damages cases
make up a substantial percentage of the cases that the
courts treat under the broad heading "mere interference" or
"interference that is not independently wrongful." As long
as the focus is on the actions and blameworthiness of the
interferer, it is reasonable to think of these tort cases as
involving mere interference. When we look to the character
of the breach, however, we see that we are dealing not with
129. See, e.g., Northern Delaware Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245
A 2d 431 (Del. Ch. 1968).
130. See id.
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"mere" interference, but with interference leading to a
breach that the breaching party was not free to make.
D. Bad Faith Breach
The other type of breach that contract law would
prevent if it could is the bad faith breach. Contract damages
are supposed to be compensatory, putting the aggrieved
party in the position she would be in if the contract had
been performed. But actually obtaining the compensation
that is due is not costless.1' Under the American rule on
attorneys' fees, unless a statute or agreement provides
otherwise, each party bears her own litigation expenses.'
This means that even a party who is clearly in breach risks
little, other than her own attorney's fees, if she engages in
stonewalling behavior.'33 Contracting parties can refuse to
perform, refuse to pay, or deny the existence or enforce-
ability of a contract.' Often, refusal or denial is part of a
good faith dispute, but it is sometimes engaged in by parties
who are certain about their obligations. The refusal to per-
form under a contract combined with the refusal to com-
pensate the aggrieved party for such failure, providing that
the relevant obligation is not the subject of a good faith
dispute, is what I am calling a "bad faith breach." The rules
of contract law actually provide incentives to behave in this
way.
There are many non-legal factors that may discourage
131. This is, of course, true for all breaches, not only the bad faith breach.
The aggrieved party must pay to enforce her contract right under the American
rule, whether she is entitled to damages or specific performance. This
enforcement cost distorts the incentives that contract law provides for efficient
transactions, but it is not at all clear that this distortion argues against the
current bifurcation of remedies. In any case, it is hard to imagine why, if we
were troubled by enforcement costs, we would seek to mitigate its effects in only
that arbitrary set of cases implicated in the interference tort. See Perlman,
supra note 20, at 88-89.
132. See Van Patten & Willard, supra note 109, at 904.
133. In some cases the litigation costs of the bad faith defendant are
actually outweighed by the return that the defendant is likely to earn by
investing the plaintiffs money. See Hersch v. Citizens Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 194
Cal. Rptr. 628, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Van Patten & Willard, supra note 109,
at 893 & n.9.
134. "[Mlalicious motive may be important in determining whether a
material breach has occurred, but it is immaterial in so far as damages for
contract breach are concerned." Wild v. Rarig, 234 N.W.2d 775, 790 (Minn.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 902 (1976).
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such bad faith behavior: the contracting party may be
concerned about her reputation or she may feel that such
behavior would violate her sense of ethics. But there are
those who behave as if undeterred by any sense of ethics,
and in some businesses the gains from bad faith breach
may outweigh reputational harm. A business might choose
to meet all claims with some resistance in order to identify
those cases in which promisees appear unlikely to pursue
their claims. Claimants who persist will then be paid
('We're very sorry about the snafu with regard to your
claim"); those who are scared away by the stonewalling will
not be paid. For example, an insurance company might find
it profitable to meet all claims by denying coverage and
then relenting only in those cases where claimants appear
likely to hire lawyers or otherwise persist.
At times the law has experimented with ways to
counterbalance this unsettling incentive to breach in bad
faith. In one established category of cases, insurance cases,
bad faith breachers face liability that goes beyond com-
pensation. The first cases of bad faith breach involved
liability insurers who breached their obligations to make
reasonable efforts to settle claims brought by third parties
against their insureds."5 The typical case involved a claim
against the insured that greatly exceeded the policy limit.
In such a case, the insured would be interested in settling
as close as possible to the policy limit, while the insurer,
who controlled the defense, would have little to lose if the
case didn't settle since the insurer would not be responsible
for any amount beyond the policy limit. Failure by the
insurer to make reasonable efforts to settle came to be
regarded as a tortious bad faith breach of contract.13 The
bad faith insurance tort later expanded to include cases in
which the insurer breached its obligation to make payments
directly to its insured."'
135. See Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958);
FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 876-77.
136. See Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
137. See Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1976);
Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973); White v. Unigard Mut.
Ins. Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986). In some jurisdictions the tort of bad faith
refusal to settle was made available not only to insureds (who are in privity
with the insurer), but to third party claimants, on the theory that there was a
private right of action under statutes governing the settlement practices of
insurers. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 592 P.2d 329 (Cal. 1979),
overruled by Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 758 P.2d 58 (Cal.
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The broad rationales articulated in these cases had
nothing in particular to do with insurance contracts: the
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
was said to be a tort38 or, broader still, tort liability was
said to be necessary in bad faith breach cases in order to
provide a remedy for every wrong."9 These generalizations
would exert pressure to expand bad faith breach beyond the
insurance context, but courts also gave narrower rationales
for this doctrine of bad faith breach in the specific area of
insurance contracts. The relationship between the insurer
and the insured was said to be a special one. 4 ' Typically the
insurer enjoys a relative advantage in bargaining power,'
4'
the insurance contract is one of adhesion, the
plaintiff/insured is under extreme financial distress at the
time of the alleged bad faith breach, 3 and the insured
contracts for peace of mind rather than commercial
advantage."M The insurance contract was seen as deserving
of special scrutiny because it was a matter of public policy
or public interest, some evidence of which is found in the
statutory and regulatory schemes that govern the
industry.
45
In 1984 the California Supreme Court began an
expansion of the tort of bad faith breach, which would be
aborted eleven years later. The California experiment sheds
light on the intractable problem of identifying this category
1988).
138. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 178.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., White, 730 P.2d at 1019 (holding that "special relationship...
exists between insurer and insured"); Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538
F.2d 111, 118 (6th Cir. 1976); Crisci, 426 P.2d at 178; John Monaghan, Note,
Extending the Bad Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial Contracts, 65
B.U. L. REV. 355, 358-63 (1985).
141. See Craft v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 572 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir.
1978); Battista, 538 F.2d at 118..
142. D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 780, 785
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978), affd, 431 A.2d 966 (Pa. 1981); Battista, 538 F.2d at 118.
143. Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 375 A.2d 428,
430 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Battista, 538 F.2d at 118.
144. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 181 Cal. Rptr.
126, 136 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), vacated, 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984),
overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995);
see also White, 730 P.2d at 1019 (noting that the "unique 'personal' (non-
commercial) nature of insurance contracts" justifies imposing the duty of good
faith and fair dealing) (citation omitted).
145. Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 349 N.E.2d 173 (Ind. 1976).
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of wrongful breach. In Seaman's Direct Buying Service v.
Standard Oil Co.,4 ' the California Supreme Court,
somewhat tentatively extended the tort of bad faith breach
beyond the insurance context. The court, wary of finding
"that breach of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing]
always gives rise to an action in tort,"47 cast its holding
narrowly. It found "that a party to a contract may incur tort
remedies when, in addition to breaching the contract, it
seeks to shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith
and without probable cause, that the contract exists.""" In a
further characterization of this new species of tortious
behavior, the court said that tort remedies could be imposed
where
a contracting party seek[s] to avoid all liability on a meritorious
contract claim by adopting a "stonewall" position ("see you in
court") without probable cause and with no belief in the existence
of a defense. Such conduct goes beyond the mere breach of
contract. It offends accepted notions of business ethics.
4 9
This decision by the California court attracted a great
deal of critical attention.5° It appeared to many that
tortious bad faith breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, familiar in the insurance context,
was about to expand to include commercial contracts
generally, "thereby eliminating the line between breach of
contract and tort."'' Four years later, the California court
retreated from Seaman's without overruling it. In Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp,'52 the court refused to extend the tort
of bad faith breach to the employment context. If an
employer wrongfully discharged an employee, the
appropriate remedy was to be found in the law of
146. 686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984), overruled by Freeman & Mills, Inc. v.
Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
147. Id. at 1166.
148. Id. at 1167.
149. Id. (citation omitted).
150. For citations to some of the voluminous commentary on the Seaman's
case, see Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 900 P.2d 669, 678-79 (1995),
which overruled Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d
1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984); FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 878 n.35; Kerry L.
Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: Contract Rises from the Ashes of the Bad
Faith Tort, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 483, 493-94 (1994).
151. Macintosh, supra note 150, at 494.
152. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
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contracts.5 ' After Foley, it was not clear whether the
Seaman's tort was predicated on a "special relationship"
somehow analogous to the relationship between insurer and
insured,.. whether there was a broader but still narrowly
and somewhat arbitrarily defined tort of bad faith denial of
the existence of a contract,'55 or whether the tort should be
understood to embrace bad faith denials of contract liability
as well.5 '
This uncertainty was put to rest in 1995 in Freeman &
Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co., 5 which overruled Seaman's
"in favor of a general rule precluding tort recovery for
noninsurance contract breach, at least in the absence of
violation of 'an independent duty arising from principles of
tort law' other than the bad faith denial of the existence of,
or liability under, the breached contract."55 So ended the
eleven-year attempt to distinguish the bad faith breach in
terms of contract outcomes. The California experience sheds
light on this category of wrongful breach that otherwise
moves below the surface of contract doctrine.
Why is it that we are willing to attach liability to the
bad faith breach of an insurance contract but are unwilling
to do so generally? Certain characteristics of the insurance
contract make it particularly susceptible to the abuse of bad
faith breach. At the same time, due to the highly regulated
nature of the insurance business, the category of insurance
153. Id. at 401. Other jurisdictions saw a similar waxing and waning of bad
faith breach. The tort of bad faith breach, recognized in the insurance context in
White v. Unigard Mutual Insurance Co., 730 P.2d 1014 (Idaho 1986), was held
not to apply in the commercial lending context. Black Canyon Racquetball Club,
Inc. v. Idaho First Natl Bank, 804 P.2d 900 (Idaho 1991); see also Nicholson v.
United Pac. Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 1342 (Mont 1985) (recognizing bad faith breach);
Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775 (Mont. 1990) (holding that "the
Nicholson tort remedy is excessive"); Davey v. Nessan, 830 P.2d 92, 96 (Mont.
1992) (describing the aspect of Nicholson that held "that a person breaches the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by acting 'arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably,'" as having been overruled in Story).
154. See Okun v. Morton, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 232-33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
155. See DuBarry Int'l, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr.
181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); see also Oki America, Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872
F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("It is impossible to draw
a principled distinction between a tortious denial of a contract's existence and a
permissible denial of liability under the terms of the contract.").
156. See Multiplex Ins. Agency, Inc. v. California Life Ins. Co., 235 Cal.
Rptr. 12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
157. 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995).
158. Id. at 679-80 (citations omitted).
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contracts has clear boundaries, giving us a high degree of
confidence that special rules can be applied to it without
spilling over to other categories.
The insurance contract is particularly susceptible to
abuse because the insured has already performed when a
claim is made or a case is to be settled. If the insurer can
escape liability, the insured will suffer a forfeiture. This is
also true in the typical lending transaction, where the
lender performs first and the borrower repays the loan over
time. The lender will also suffer forfeiture if the borrower
escapes liability. But the typical lender is well positioned to
defend its contract rights because that is part of its
business and because it is likely to have shifted
enforcement costs to the borrower by contractual provisions
for attorneys' fees. The incentive for the insurer to breach is
also significantly magnified by the lottery-like nature of the
insurance contract: when it comes time to pay on a
particular ticket, the difference between the value of the
performances exchanged under the contract is enormous.
None of this is generally true in the wrongful discharge
cases. The employer is not generally withholding payment
for benefits received (back pay). Rather the employer is
denying the employee's mere expectation. Moreover, the
termination of employment leads to the termination of a
roughly equivalent exchange. If the employer were to
escape liability, the employee would not suffer a forfeiture,
and the benefits denied the employee through termination
are roughly equivalent to the benefits denied the employer.
The California court seemed to have these differences in
mind when it wrote in Foley that
there is less inherent relevant tension between the interests of
employers and employees than exists between that of insurers and
insureds. Thus the need to place disincentives on an employer's
conduct in addition to those already imposed by law simply does
not rise to the same level as that created by the conflicting
interests at stake in the insurance context.
159
There is no reason to think that the court in Foley was
trying to justify stonewalling or bad faith behavior in the
employment context. It was giving reasons why obnoxious
behavior that may also exist in the employment context is
much more likely to be a problem in the insurance context.
159. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988).
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This is only half of the explanation for limiting bad faith
breach to insurance contracts. To say that the problem is
severe in the insurance context does not explain the refusal
to address the problem that exists generally.
What is the cost that we are willing to bear in a
category of cases where the incentive for abuse is high, but
that we are not willing to bear generally? It has to do with
the difficulty of distinguishing the bad faith breach or
denial of liability from the good faith dispute. Rooting out
bad faith breach generally would require the often futile
attempt to ascertain the mental states of breaching parties.
We might be willing to engage in such an inquiry if there
were no other remedy for an aggrieved party. But the
aggrieved party is not without any remedy; the law of
contract provides one, less than adequate though it may be.
Separating the bad faith breach from the good faith
insistence on judicial resolution of a dispute would be a
costly undertaking and one that would likely lead to an
unsatisfactory number of false results.
As one California appellate court put it while wrestling
with the status of the Seaman's tort in the aftermath of
Foley: if the tort were extended to contracts generally, "then
any party attempting to defend a disputed contract claim
would risk, at the very least, exposure to the imposition of
tort damages and an expensive and time-consuming
expansion of the litigation into an inquiry as to the motives
and state of mind of the breaching party."16 A rule of
liability for bad faith breach would be costly because the
behavior upon which liability would depend is so difficult to
identify. The law of contracts does provide a remedy-
compensatory damages-in these cases. Is it so important
to add extra penalties for bad faith behavior that we are
willing to risk penalizing those who dispute contract claims
in good faith?
It is on this point that the general bad faith breach
cases foundered within the realm of contract. But failing to
provide additional penalties for bad faith breach is a far cry
from determining that contract law should be regarded as
seeking to encourage or even to remain neutral with respect
to bad faith breach.
The pressure to do something about bad faith breach
160. DuBarry Int'l, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr.
181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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can also be seen in the efforts, mostly unsuccessful, to win
punitive damages in contract cases involving outrageous
behavior. 6' Some courts have stretched to find independent
tortious behavior in bad faith breach cases in order to get
around the ban on punitive damages.'62 This has sometimes
taken the form of finding a duty in the public-service
character of the promisor's business, the breach of which is
tortious.16 The bad faith insurance cases are an outgrowth
of this approach. Some courts have allowed punitive dam-
ages by finding that a bad faith breach involves some sort of
fraudulent behavior, even though the behavior falls short of
what would be required for tort liability."
It is clear that the law of contracts, while not having
found a satisfactory way of penalizing or deterring bad faith
breach, does not have an affirmative policy of neutrality
with respect to it. Contract law would punish bad faith
breach if only it could find a way to identify it. We will see
below that there is a subset of the bad faith breach cases
that the law is able to identify. This set of cases is at the
heart of a significant group of tortious interference cases:
the take-the-money-and-run cases, which the courts treat
under the broad heading of mere interference or inter-
ference that is not independently wrongful. Not every bad
faith breach reveals itself as such through the actions of a
third party interferer. In the take-the-money-and-run cases,
however, the presence of the interferer brings the bad faith
161. See J.J. White, Inc. v. Metropolitan Merchandise Mart, 107 A.2d 892
(Del. Super. Ct. 1954); Den v. Den, 222 A.2d 647 (D.C. 1966); FARNSWORTH,
supra note 5, § 12.8.
162. See Timothy J. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The
Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 236-40 (1977).
Sometimes the "independent tort" amounts to little more than refusing to
perform after accepting the other party's performance. See Excel Handbag Co.
v. Edison Bros. Stores, 630 F.2d 379, 384-85 (5th Cir. 1980).
163. See Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (finding that real
estate broker is a quasi-fiduciary); Fort Smith & W. R. Co. v. Ford, 126 P. 745
(Okla. 1912) (pertaining to a railroad).
164. See Wright v. Public Say. Life Ins., 204 S.E.2d 57 (S.C. 1974); Wellborn
v. Dixon, 49 S.E. 232 (S.C. 1904). Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, juries
were given relatively free reign to determine damages and one imagines that
bad faith behavior on the part of breachers was taken into account in the jury
room. A side effect of the creation of rules by judges to control damage awards
was the creation of a safe harbor for bad faith breach. It is not surprising that
the classic rules limiting damages-the limitations of avoidability,
foreseeability and certainty-can all function somewhat flexibly, allowing
higher damage awards in the case of bad faith breachers.
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character of the breach to the surface.
III. LINKING IMPROPER INTERFERENCE AND WRONGFUL
BREACH
Now that we have become aware of the distinction
between those breaches that are wrongful and those that
are not, the problem of the improperness of mere inter-
ference appears in a different light. The cases of mere
interference, which the courts have tended to lump to-
gether, can be divided into those that involve interference
leading to a wrongful breach and those that involve inter-
ference that leads to a breach that the breaching party is
free to make. Most of the cases of liability for mere
interference involve wrongful breaches-and all of the com-
pelling cases do.
A. No Adequate Damages
One of the prototypical fact patterns in cases of liability
for mere interference involves interference that leads to a
breach for which there is no adequate remedy in damages.
Lumley v. Gye 65 was such a case. It is an intuitively
appealing case for liability because the plaintiffs contract
right was one that the law (in the broad sense that includes
both law and equity) sought to enforce as a property right.
The attempt to so enforce the right failed, but that had to
do with the tools at equity's disposal and was not a
judgment about the rightfulness or wrongfulness of the
breaching party's behavior. Lumley v. Gye came to be un-
derstood as a case about interference with any contract, but
it might have been better understood as a case about inter-
ference that caused a breach that was wrongful.
Allowing liability for tortious interference with contract
in cases where the aggrieved party would not have had an
adequate damage remedy against the breaching party does
not implicate the concerns of the critics of the tort. As long
as a contract right is protected by a liability rule, the would-
be breaching party is free to breach and pay damages. The
will of the breaching party is disregarded when we assign
blame to a third party who induces the breaching party to
do what she was supposed to be free to choose herself. This
165. 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 2 El. & B1. 216 (Q.B. 1853).
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sort of problem vanishes in the no-adequate-damages cases
because the breaching party is not free to breach in the first
place. There is nothing counterintuitive about holding
someone liable who intentionally induces such a breach.
There is also nothing troubling from an economic
perspective about tort liability in the no-adequate-damages
cases. Whether the termination of the contract between A
and B would be efficient or not, the law of contracts would
place the right to compel performance in the hands of A if it
could: the route to an efficient outcome, whether through
termination or performance, would be decided by nego-
tiation with A. Contract law means to deny B the right to
breach if A so chooses. If A does give up her right to compel
performance, then A will have no contract claim against B
and no tort claim against T. Tortious interference in these
cases sets up no added obstacles to the efficient result.
Two difficulties confront anyone who would identify no-
adequate-damages cases among the tortious interference
cases. First, because the adequacy of damages was irrel-
evant to the approach that the judges understood them-
selves to be taking in these cases, significant facts relating
to the issue are often undeveloped. Second, there has been a
substantial change during this century in the criteria for
determining whether damages are or are not adequate as a
prerequisite to the availability of specific performance: "The
tendency is . . . to liberalize the granting of specific
performance and injunction by enlarging the classes of
cases in which damages are regarded as an inadequate
remedy." 6 In particular, long-term contracts whose quan-
tity term depends on some variable such as the output or
requirements of a firm have become the prototype of the
specifically enforceable contract. 7 Many of the reported
better deal cases are cases that might not have been re-
garded as involving no-adequate-damages at the time of
their decision.'68 In spite of this, I regard these cases as
support for the notion that something like an awareness of
the inadequacy of damages is at work in the intuitions of
the judges when they found liability. It was, after all, a
sense that long-term output and requirements contracts
166. FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 858 (footnote omitted).
167. See U.C.O. § 2-716 cmt. 2 (1995).
168. See, e.g., Gold Medal Farms, Inc. v. Rutland County Co-Operative
Creamery, Inc., 195 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 1959).
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could not be adequately enforced with damage awards that
led to the expansion of the availability of specific perfor-
mance. It is not hard to imagine that the same pressure
made itself felt in the tortious interference cases of the day.
Lumley v. Gye is the premiere example of a no-
adequate-damages, tortious interference case. There are
countless others. Gonzales v. Reichenthaler'69 and Gold
Medal Farms, Inc. v. Rutland County Co-Operative Cream-
ery, Inc.,"7 were cited by the New York Court of Appeals in
Guard-Life7 ' for the proposition that tortious interference
with contract did not require wrongfulness on the part of
the interferer. Gonzales involved the leasing of a game
called the "Kentucky Derby" by the plaintiff, the proprietor
of a Coney Island establishment. The game "consisted of a
mechanism by which miniature horses were driven along a
miniature race course by the operation of machinery
controlled by the patrons of the game."172 The manu-
facturer/lessor agreed not to operate, sell or lease the game
to anyone in competition with the plaintiff. The plaintiff
succeeded in an action for tortious interference brought
against a competing operator who had induced the manu-
facturer to breach its contract with the plaintiff. The plain-
tiff would have had a right to an injunction against the
manufacturer to prevent it from breaching its covenant not
to compete. The plaintiffs right was protected by a property
rule. The manufacturer's breach was therefor wrongful, and
the interference that led to the breach was improper for
that reason, not because it was mere interference.
The contract at issue in Gold Medal Farms, Inc. v.
Rutland County Co-Operative Creamery, Inc."' was an
output contract (an agreement by the seller to sell its entire
output to the buyer) that was repudiated by the seller with
six months remaining on the contract. Under Article 2 of
the UCC, which would govern the contract today, specific
performance is generally available for such a breach.74
Damages are regarded as inadequate for the breach of
169. 135 N.E. 938 (N.Y. 1922) (mem.).
170. 195 N.Y.S.2d 179.
171. Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445,
(N.Y. 1980)
172. Gonzales v. Kentucky Derby Co., 197 A.D. 277, 278 (1921), affd sub
nom., Gonzales v. Reichenthaler, 135 N.E. 938 (1922) (mem.).
173. 195 N.Y.S.2d 179.
174. See U.C.C. § 2-716 cmt. 2 (1995).
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requirement and output contracts because the difficulty of
finding a replacement market or source is generally one of
the reasons for choosing this form of contract and because
the determination of future damages requires information
as to future quantities and prices-one or both of which is
often unknown at the time of breach. Gold Medal Farms is
another example of a breach which, under the law of
contracts, the breaching parties would not be free to make.
The aggrieved party's right is protected by a property rule,
not a liability rule; once again interference that leads to
such a wrongful breach is improper for that reason, not
because it was mere interference.
One of the most powerful judicial pronouncements on
the appropriateness of liability for mere interference is to
be found in the California case, Imperial Ice Co. v. Ros-
sier.'75 Justice Traynor said that "[w]hatever interest society
has in encouraging free and open competition by means not
in themselves unlawful, contractual stability is generally
accepted as of greater importance than competitive free-
dom."' Imperial Ice involved the sale of an ice business.
The seller, who had promised not to compete with the buyer
or his successors in interest, was allegedly violating the
covenant and selling ice supplied by Rossier and the other
defendants in the tort action. The complaint was held to
state a cause of action against Rossier for inducing the
seller to breach his covenant. What was alleged was clearly
the inducing of a breach that the breaching party was not
free to make; that is, this sort of covenant is enforced speci-
fically provided that it is enforceable at all.
Cases in which the aggrieved party would not have had
an adequate remedy in damages are common among the
mere interference cases. Many of the cases deal with output
or requirements contracts, 7 7 contracts for unique personal171 171
service, transfers of interests in real property, covenants
175. 112 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1941).
176. Id. at 633.
177. See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., 268 F.
121 (D. Del. 1920).
178. See American League Baseball Club of New York, Inc. v. Pasquel, 63
N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (enjoining defendant from interfering with
contracts of baseball players, whether or not contracts enforceable by specific
performance); Wade v. Culp, 23 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. App. 1939) (affirming
liability for inducing inventor to breach promise "to spend [his] entire time in
the development of a working model" electric steak grill); Anderson v.
Moskovitz, 157 N.E. 601, 602 (Mass. 1927) (finding "evidence that it was
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not to compete8 ' and exclusive agency."'
B. Take the Money and Run
Another prototypical fact pattern in the mere inter-
ference cases is the take-the-money-and-run case. Here the
interference leads to a breach that can be recognized as a
bad faith breach. Were a similar breach to occur without
interference it might not be recognizable as a bad faith
breach, and in any case it would not be treated any differ-
ently by contract law even if it could be so recognized. But
the difficulty of identifying a bad faith breach is substan-
tially reduced in the take-the-money-and-run cases. In
these cases, a third party interferer joins the cast of
characters, and what would otherwise have been private
mental states of bad faith now play out on the public stage
as interactions between the breacher and interferer.
Hornstein v. Podwitz82 is an example of a take-the-
money-and-run case. According to the complaint, the
plaintiff, a real estate broker, had arranged a sale of real
estate from a corporate seller to individual purchasers. The
seller and purchasers conspired to conceal from the broker
the fact of the sale, to deprive the broker of the commission
to which he was entitled and "to distribute themselves a
sum of money in lieu of the commissions."83 The sale was
carried out and the seller "allowed to [the purchasers] a
difficult, if not impossible, for the plaintiff to hire a competent" substitute).
179. See Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co., 42 S.E.2d 218 (N.C.
1947) (finding cause of action stated for interference with contract to sell
standing timber); White v. Massee, 211 N.W. 839 (Iowa 1927) (involving con-
tract for transfer of homestead); Swaney v. Crawley, 157 N.W. 910 (Minn. 1916)
(involving conveyance of land).
180. See McNutt Oil & Ref. Co. v. D'Ascoli, 281 P.2d 966 (Ariz. 1955);
Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier, 112 P.2d 631 (Cal. 1941); Mahoney v. Roberts, 110
S.W. 225 (Ark. 1908). Wear-Ever Aluminum, Inc. v. Townecraft Indus., Inc., 182
A.2d 387 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1962) is a remarkable case in which a substantial
segment of a company's door-to-door sales force, at-will employees, were stolen
away by a competitor. The court treats these at-will contracts almost as if they
contained no-compete clauses.
181. See Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 605 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1979) (involving an exclusive dealer), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983, and cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 890 (1980); Beekman v. Marsters, 80 N.E. 817, 818 (Mass.
1907) (involving exclusive agency for hotel bookings; "damage... incapable of
accurate ascertainment").
182. 173 N.E. 674 (N.Y. 1930).
183. Id. at 674-75.
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part of the commissions" that were owed to the broker. The
complaint was held to contain "all of the essential allega-
tions necessary in a complaint to recover damages for
wrongfully inducing a breach of contract.""8
Hornstein was the third case cited by the New York
Court of Appeals in Guard-Life85 for the proposition that
"persuasion to breach alone, as by an offer of better terms,
has been sufficient to impose liability on one who thereby
interferes with performance."" 6 Hornstein can of course be
read this broadly by a court with the authority to do so. But
the fact that the purchasers in Hornstein persuaded the
seller by an offer of better terms (alone) is hardly what
makes it a compelling case for liability.
This is a compelling case because the interferer and the
breacher took the broker's performance without paying for
it, and they did so in such a way that the breacher's
intention to not perform, to not compensate and to other-
wise deny liability on the contract, in bad faith, was evi-
dent. If B breaches by refusing to perform a wholly exe-
cutory contract with A, then B will be liable to A for the
value of A's expectation. In a rising market, for example, B
would be liable to A for the difference between the market
value and the contract price of B's performance; in a flat or
falling market B will owe A nothing. It may be that B found
some third party willing, for whatever reason, to pay more
for B's performance than its market value. If, however, B
refuses to perform after B has already received A's
performance, then B will be liable to A for more than a
mere expectation. B will be liable to A for the entire value
to A of B's promised performance. If B refuses to perform
and refuses to compensate A for the breach, B will have
done more than rob A of an expectation; B will have robbed
A of the benefit conferred by A upon B in addition to A's
expectation.
In Hornstein, the fact that the real estate broker had
fully performed, and that the seller and purchasers
schemed to deny the broker both performance under the
contract and compensation for the breach, makes this a
more compelling case than a mere offer of better terms to
184. Id. at 675.
185. Guard-Life Corp. v S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445
(N.Y. 1980).
186. Id. at 450-51 (citations omitted).
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the sellers. The better terms offered to the seller arose not
from some higher-valued use of resources but from a
scheme to take the broker's performance without paying for
it. This was not an efficient breach. Once the broker had
performed, the seller was no longer free to shop the deal
around to others.
The prototypical take-the-money-and-run case has the
following elements: T knows that B has a contract with A; T
knows that B has received the benefit of A's performance; T
knows that if B performed or compensated A, B would not
deal with T on the terms that B is willing to deal with T
(and conversely that if B deals with T, B will not perform
for or compensate A); and T persuades B to breach and deal
with T. The breach in a take-the-money-and-run case is a
bad faith breach, one that B is not free to make. There is
nothing troubling about holding T liable for causing such a
wrongful breach. In particular, there is no problem from the
standpoint of efficiency with holding T liable. The bad faith
breach is never a Pareto-efficient breach.'87 Extending
liability for B's breach beyond B to T does not interfere with
the incentives that flow from the remedies principles of
contract law since B has no business not performing
without compensating A.
We have seen above that the law of contracts has not
found a satisfactory way to deal with cases of bad faith
breach. As a consequence, the law of contracts imposes no
additional penalties on the bad faith breacher. That does
not mean that the law of tortious interference should follow
suit and deny liability for inducing a bad faith breach.
The tortiously-induced bad faith breach cases look quite
different from bad faith breach cases that involve no
interference. A number of factors combine to make it easier
to identify the take-the-money-and-run interference case
from the straight bad-faith-breach contract case where
much more is likely to turn on B's state of mind: a third-
party interferer (T) is present and there is evidence that T
187. A bad faith breach may be Kaldor-Hicks efficient-the gains to B and T
may be greater than the loss to A-but it is the more rigorous Pareto criterion
that is relevant to efficient breach analysis. Because the basic principle of
contract remedies is that the aggrieved party is to be put in the position she
would have been in if the contract had been performed, an efficient breach
satisfies the Pareto criterion. I am not aware of anyone who has criticized the
tort of interference with contract on the grounds that it prevents breaches that
would satisfy the Kaldor-Hicks criterion but not the Pareto criterion.
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knew of the contract, T knew that A had already performed
under it, and T knew that the transaction between T and B
was likely to leave A damaged and uncompensated. An
analogy can be drawn here to the difference in criminal law
between an attempt by an individual to commit a crime
that has not yet manifested in any overt act and a
conspiracy by two or more individuals to commit a crime,
which due to the nature of communication between two or
more people, will have manifested itself in some way."'
Thus it may be that a bad faith breach by B is a wrong,
but due to the difficulty of differentiating it from a good
faith breach the law of contracts offers no remedy to the
aggrieved party beyond compensatory damages. This does
not mean, however, that the law of contracts means tacitly
to encourage such a breach in the same way that it does an
efficient breach. When a bad faith breach is induced by a
third party interferer in a way that fits the contours of the
take-the-money-and-run interference tort, the existence of
corroborating evidence makes us confident that we can
recognize B's breach as one that is wrongful. The deal
between the seller and the purchasers in Hornstein, which
was premised on not compensating the broker, provides the
kind of evidence that is generally lacking in the typical two-
party, bad faith breach. The court has more to work with
than a mere "inquiry as to the motives and state of mind of
the breaching party.""9 In the same way that T commits a
wrong when she induces B to breach where B has no right
to breach because A's contract right is meant to be
protected by a property rule, so T commits a wrong when
she induces B to commit a bad faith breach.
Again, the concerns of the critics of the interference
torts are not implicated in these cases. Finding tortious
interference in the take-the-money-and-run cases does not
interfere with efficient behavior. If A has not yet performed,
then B's breach might be efficient. But if A has already
performed, then contract law would have B either perform
or pay A the full value of B's promised performance.
Efficient breach is no longer an option.
The take-the-money-and-run breach is a familiar
188. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 218-25 (1978).
189. DuBarry Intl, Inc. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr.
181, 192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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pattern in the cases of interference with contract.9 ° The
courts often speak about take-the-money-and-run cases as
if liability attached to the mere offering of a better deal. The
facts of the cases tell quite a different story.
C. Are There Any Real "Mere Interference" Cases?
So what is left? Are there precedents for attaching
liability to the offering of a better deal that does not involve
a wrongful breach?
1. Labor Cases. One of the factors that propelled the
development of the interference tort was its usefulness as a
weapon against labor.' Strikes, boycotts and other tactics
of organized labor interfered with the contracts of targeted
firms. These cases may be viewed as mere interference
precedents, but sometimes a narrow characterization is
more accurately descriptive than a general one. What
moved the courts in these cases was the perceived threat of
organized labor to the ordered, capitalist fabric of society.
The interference torts were hardly the ideal venue for
190. See, e.g., Kennedy v. George Cully Real Estate, Inc., 296 So.2d 551 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So.2d 183 (Fla. 1975); Allen v. Powell, 56
Cal. Rptr. 715 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Johnson v. Gustafson, 277 N.W. 252 (Minn.
1938).
191. See Tortious Interference, supra note 32, at 1533 ("While combinations
of businessmen that destroyed the livelihood of nonmembers were tolerated,
unions that inflicted similar harm as a means to increase bargaining power
rather than as an end were found to have engaged in intimidation and duress.")
(footnotes omitted); see also Roraback v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators Union,
168 N.W. 766, 767 (Minn. 1918) (holding that union's attempt to force theater
owner to hire union projectionists was "clearly an invasion of the rights secured
to him by the Constitution"); Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S.
229, 259 (1917) (holding "that the purpose entertained by defendants to bring
about a strike at plaintiffs mine in order to compel plaintiff, through fear of
financial loss, to consent to the unionization of the mine as the lesser evil, was
an unlawful purpose"); Curran v. Galen, 46 N.E. 297, 299 (N.Y. 1897) (holding
that union's agreement with association of employers to only hire union workers
is no defense to action by employee against union for procuring employee's
dismissal, "for there would certainly be a compulsion or a fettering of the
individual glaringly at variance with that freedom in the pursuit of happiness
which is believed to be guaranteed to all by the provisions of the fundamental
law of the state"); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896);
Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' & Trimmers' Assembly, 26 A. 505 (Md. 1893)
(holding union's causing of non-union employee's discharge actionable, even
though discharge did not breach employment contract).
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formulating labor policy.9 ' The common law courts' hit or
miss judgments about the improperness of strikes and
boycotts were eventually superseded by a more carefully
considered statutory and regulatory scheme. Federal labor
law has largely preempted this area of interference law.193
But even if a case involving a labor dispute arose that was
not covered by federal law, one would hope that the court
would decide the matter directly as a matter of labor law
rather than letting it turn on the abstract principle of mere
interference. In other words, if a court is going to declare a
strike or boycott illegal as a matter of state law, it should
identify the labor practice that is unlawful and admit that
it is making state labor law. Any such cases would then fit
into my scheme as involving interference that is improper
apart from mere interference.
2. Trade Cases. There are cases that involve what we
would classify today as unfair trade practice or anti-trust
disputes. Just as we can see in the development of the
interference tort shifting conceptions of the legitimacy of
organized labor, so we also find attempts to arrive at the
outlines of acceptable competitive practices on the side of
capital.'94 Some of the cases discussed below tell a mixed
story. The opinions discuss general interference, but the
facts often suggest that the courts were wrestling with
anticompetitive practices which today would belong to the
field of anti-trust law.
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co.,"' decided
192. Typical of the kinds of questions raised in these labor cases are the
following:
[W]hat means may lawfully be used by a collection or order of workmen
to cause the discharge of other workmen .... Whether means which
would be lawful if used by an individual become unlawful and amount
to a conspiracy when used in combination .... Whether acts which
might lawfully be done simply to further the welfare of those who
participate in them become unlawful when inspired by a malevolent
design to injure obnoxious workmen.
Carter v. Oster, 112 S.W. 995, 997-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1908).
193. See, e.g., Vane v. Nocella, 494 A.2d 181 (Md. 1985) (holding that
National Labor Relations Act preempts tort claim); California State Council of
Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 540
(1980), rev'd on other grounds, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
194. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn. 1909); Knickerbocker Ice
Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 69 A. 405 (Md. 1908).
195. 69 A. 405 (Md. 1908).
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in 1903, is a good example of a case involving
anticompetitive practices and interference claims. The
Gardiner Dairy Company had a contract to. purchase up to
twenty tons per day of ice from the Sumwalt Ice & Coal Co.
Sumwalt in turn purchased this ice from the Knickerbocker
Ice Co., which was apparently the only regional source for
such large quantities of ice at the time. Knickerbocker "no-
tified [Sumwalt] that it would refuse to deliver any ice
whatever to it, unless it refrained from delivering ice to
[Gardiner]."196 Sumwalt breached its contract with
Gardiner, and Gardiner "was compelled to purchase ice
directly from [Knickerbocker at a price .considerably
greater, and on terms considerably less advantageous to it,
than it was enjoying under its contract with the Sumwalt
Company." "' Gardiner sued Knickerbocker for causing the
breach, and the Maryland Court of Appeals held that
Gardiner had properly stated a claim. In a revealing
passage, the court rejected the notion that the tort could be
used as a hammer against labor but not against capital:
Why should a labor organization, which has the right to organize
and act for the protection and benefit of its members so long as it
does not infringe upon the rights of others, be responsible for
causing the discharge of one who it believes interferes with the
interests of its members by being so employed, while an employer
of labor can maliciously and wantonly, or for his own selfish
purposes, cripple another employer with impunity? . . . Such
distinction, based on the technical ground that the relation of
master and servant exists in the one case and not in the other,
would be well calculated to impress laborers with the belief that
the law discriminates between labor and capital, making the one
responsible, but not the other. Trusts and combinations of capital
have ruined many while hiding behind means apparently lawful;
but if they cannot be reached when it is shown that they have
maliciously and wantonly, or for their own selfish purposes, not
only prevented others from making contracts, but compelled
contractors to break their contracts, then indeed is the law
helpless.
198
While the Knickerbocker opinion spoke in broad terms
about the unlawfulness of breaking a contract and inducing
196. Id. at 406.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 407.
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another to do such an unlawful act,'99 the facts tell a story of
interference that was improper because it involved "mono-
polistic" or "predatory" practices. Such practices are now
regulated by federal and state anti-trust laws."' To the
extent that anti-competitive concerns are driving courts to
find liability in interference cases they should say so,
basing their judgment of improperness in violations of
statutory, regulatory or common law anti-trust principles.20 '
The Maryland Court of Appeals has recently made a move
in this direction, questioning the broadness of the
Knickerbocker opinion and recharacterizing one of its more
recent opinions as holding that "acts of interference
committed in violation of a state antitrust statute
constituted acts of wrongful or malicious interference." 2
3. Improper Motive. The cases that find interference
improper because it is accompanied by an improper motive
are problematic. An example is Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
v. Aurora Air Service,0 3 in which a jury verdict against an
interferer was upheld because the jury could have found
that ill-will was the dominant motive for causing the con-
tract to be terminated. 4 On one hand, the improper motive
199. Id. at 408.
200. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585 (1985) (involving federal law); Natural Design, Inc. v. Rouse Co., 485 A.2d
663 (Md. 1984) (involving claims of violation of state anti-trust laws and
malicious interference with business).
201. Professor Lao, evidently concerned that the Supreme Court has
"redefined the requirements for establishing [a case of per se illegal vertical
price fixing] so narrowly as to make it almost impossible to prove in the real
world," Lao, supra note 24, at 36-37 (footnote omitted), argues for an expansive
version of the interference tort. Even if she is right that we would be better off if
state courts picked up the anti-trust ball that the feds have dropped, it does not
follow that we should have an expansive interference tort that regards mere
interference with a contract as improper. If state courts want to make anti-trust
law they should do so by identifying the kind of behavior that is illegal, not by
hiding behind the abstract principle of mere interference. Courts are often quite
open about their trade concerns, but too often they then proceed to state their
holdings generally. See, e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Louis Weber & Co.,
161 F. 219 (N.D. IM. 1908).
202. Alexander & Alexander Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Associates, Inc.,
650 A.2d 260, 270 (Md. 1994) (recharacterizing its holding in Natural Design,
Inc. v. Rouse Co., 485 A.2d 663 (Md. 1984)).
203. 604 P.2d 1090 (Alaska 1979).
204. Id. at 1094. The holding is remarkable because it allows liability even if
a reasonable person in the interferer's shoes acting with no ill-will would have
interfered with the contract under similar circumstances-acting, for example,
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cases might be seen as posing no substantial threat to the
offering of a better deal. In the typical better deal scenario,
the one who offers a better deal does so for the purpose of
entering into a transaction, without any intention (at least
without the dominant intention) of harming the aggrieved
contract party. On the other hand, the absence of any
objective criteria for determining the presence of ill-will or
whether ill-will is the dominant motive makes it difficult to
determine whether "improper motive" is actually func-
tioning as a screen for attaching liability to mere inter-
ference.
While this is an important issue, it is peripheral to the
issue of the improperness of mere interference. I would join
those critics of the interference tort that think that the
courts would be better off not attempting to police the
defendant's moral states or motives or should at least base
liability for improper motivation "only on objective indicia of
activity producing social loss." 205 If the law does recognize
that improper motive makes interference improper, it is at
least finding the interference to be improper for a reason
other than mere interference.
4. Liability for Mere Interference. What is left is a group
of cases that really do attach liability to interference where
there is nothing improper other than the interference itself.
The cases involve no independent wrong such as a crime,
tort or violation of a statute or regulation or violation of
labor or trade policies. There is no malicious motive or
causing of a wrongful breach. 6 These cases, of which there
are surprisingly few, are inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of contract remedies described above and should
be overturned.
The dearth of these cases suggests that courts have
been wiser in their decisions than the opinions demon-
strate. In cases that attach liability for mere interference,
judges apparently did not view the cases as I do, but they
behaved in large part as if their intuition of the
wrongfulness of the breach, when viewed through the lens
out of safety concerns. It is also remarkable because the contract was at-will,
specifically providing that it might be terminated.
205. Perlman, supra note 20, at 98.
206. See, e.g., Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. DeWitt, 87 A. 927 (1913), affd,




of interference law, informed their decisions. The cases of
interference causing a wrongful breach are what drove the
courts to find liability in mere interference cases. The
courts articulated a rule that was more general than the
intuition that motivated their decisions. The cases that do
not fit my approach are the result of courts simply adhering
to their overly general rule.
CONCLUSION
Tortious interference with contract has been
characterized very broadly by courts to include persuasion
to breach a contract by offering a better deal. This broad
view of the tort upsets the careful balancing of incentives
that is embodied in the rules of contract damages. If
contract law means to encourage certain breaches of con-
tract then tort law should not deter those same breaches. If
we think that tort law should deter those breaches, then
there is no reason to have the contract remedies regime
that we have. '
As lohg as we do have the current remedies regime,
interference law should be brought into harmony with it.
That does not mean that the entire category of behavior
that the courts have referred to as mere interference should
be treated as privileged. Cutting the tort back that far
would mean overruling compelling precedents and would
immunize interferers whose interference leads to breaches
that the law of contracts regards as wrongful. There is no
reason to move that far. Instead, the courts should look
through to the character of the underlying breach in the
mere interference cases, allowing liability in those cases
where the underlying breach is wrongful, and finding no
liability otherwise.
The refinement of the definition of the tort that I have
proposed divides the better deal cases into two categories:
those that involve wrongful breaches and those that do not.
The better deal cases that have driven the evolution of the
tort in the courts have for the most part involved wrongful
breaches: breaches for which the aggrieved contract party
would not have had an adequate remedy in damages or
breaches that involved bad faith refusal by the breaching
party both to perform and to compensate the aggrieved
party. The justice and efficiency concerns of the critics of
the tort are not implicated by these cases. The cases that
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should concern the critics are those in which interference is
found tortious even though the breach involves no such
wrong. If the courts were to recognize the categories of
wrongful breach that I have identified, their character-
izations of the tort could be narrowed accordingly. Such a
narrowing would not lead to a substantial change in
outcomes. It would, however, remove the current threat of
liability for inducing breaches of contract that are efficient.

